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Torpedo Service in the Harbor and Water Defences of Charleston.

BY GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD.

[The following article from the distinguished engineer and accomplished soldier who made the heroic defence of Charleston, has been delayed much longer than we had intended by circumstances over which we had no control.]

Letter from General Beauregard.

Rev. J. W. JONES, D. D.,
Secretary Southern Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia:

DEAR SIR: During last summer several articles appeared in Northern papers, giving accounts of Russian torpedoes and torpedo-boats in the Danube, in which erroneous statements were made of the use of those engines of destruction at Charleston during our late civil war. To give a correct account of their use, as well as of other means employed by me to defend that city against the powerful naval and land batteries of the Federals, I prepared a paper on the subject for the *Philadelphia Weekly Times*, which, through accidental delays in transmission, did not appear until the first week in October. Since then, an interesting article on "torpedo service," by Commander W. T. Glassel, C. S. N., who commanded the "David" in its gallant night attack on the New Ironsides in the outer harbor of Charleston, Oct. 5, 1863, has appeared in last November's number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, which enables me to correct a few slight errors I had made in my narrative of that attack. I have added also to my article a few remarks taken from a Northern source which

contains information I did not at first possess. Thus amended, I enclose it to you that it may appear of record, should you think it worthy of the honor, among the valuable Confederate papers which are published monthly in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, so ably conducted by you.

I remain, dear sir, yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Narrative by General Beauregard.

On my return to Charleston in September, 1862, to assume command of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia, I found the defences of those two States in a bad and incomplete condition, including defective location and arrangement of works, even at Charleston and Savannah. Several points—such as the mouths of the Stono and Edisto rivers, and the headwaters of Broad river at Port Royal—I found unprotected; though soon after the fall of Fort Sumter, in 1861, as I was about to be detached, I had designated them to be properly fortified. A recommendation had even been made by my immediate predecessor that the outer defences of Charleston Harbor should be given up as untenable against the ironclads and monitors then known to be under construction at the North, and that the water-line of the immediate city of Charleston should be made the sole line of defence. This course, however, not having been authorized by the Richmond authorities, it was not attempted, except that the fortifications of Cole's Island—the key to the defence of the Stono river—was abandoned and the harbor in the mouth of the Stono left open to the enemy, who made it their base of operations. Immediately on my arrival I inspected the defences of Charleston and Savannah, and made a requisition on the War Department for additional troops and heavy guns deemed necessary; but neither could be furnished, owing, it was stated, to the pressing wants of the Confederacy at other points. Shortly afterward Florida was added to my command, but without any increase of troops or guns, except the few already in that State; and, later, several brigades were withdrawn from me, notwithstanding my protest, to reinforce the armies of Virginia and Tennessee.

As I have already said, I found at Charleston an exceedingly bad defensive condition against a determined attack. Excepting Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, the works and batteries covering Charleston Harbor, including Fort Sumter, were insufficiently armed and their barbette guns without the protection of heavy traverses. In all the harbor works there were only three 10-inch and a few 8-inch columbiads, which had been left in Forts Sumter and Moultrie by Major Anderson, and about a dozen rifle guns—unbanded 32 pounders, made by the Confederates—which burst after a few discharges. There were, however, a number of good 42-pounders of the old pattern, which I afterward had rifled and banded. I found a continuous floating boom of large timbers bound together and interlinked, stretching across from Fort Sumter to Fort Moultrie. But this was a fragile and unreliable barrier, as it offered too great a resistance to the strong current of the ebb and flood tide at full moon, especially after southeasterly gales, which backed up the waters in the bay and in the Ashley and Cooper rivers. It was exposed, therefore, at such periods, to be broken, particularly as the channel-bottom was hard and smooth, and the light anchors which held the boom in position were constantly dragging—a fact which made the breaking of the boom an easy matter under the strain of hostile steamers coming against it under full headway. For this reason the engineers had proposed the substitution of a rope obstruction, which would be free from tidal strain, but little had been done toward its preparation. I, therefore, soon after assuming command, ordered its immediate completion, and, to give it protection and greater efficiency, directed that two lines of torpedoes be planted a few hundred yards in advance of it. But before the order could be carried out, a strong southerly storm broke the timber boom in several places, leaving the channel unprotected, except by the guns of Forts Sumter and Moultrie. Fortunately, however, the Federal fleet made no effort to enter the harbor, as it might have done if it had made the attempt at night. A few days later the rope obstruction and torpedoes were in position, and so remained without serious injury till the end of the war.

The rope obstruction was made of two heavy cables, about five or six feet apart, the one below the other, and connected together by a network of smaller ropes. The anchors were made fast to

the lower cable, and the buoys or floats to the upper one. The upper cable carried a fringe of smaller ropes, about three-fourths of an inch in diameter by fifty feet long, which floated as so many "streamers" on the surface, destined to foul the screw propeller of any steamer which might attempt to pass over the obstruction. Shortly after these cables were in position a blockade-runner, in attempting at night to pass through the gap purposely left open near the Sullivan Island shore, under the guns of Fort Moultrie and of the outside batteries, accidentally crossed the end of the rope obstruction, when one of the streamers got entangled around the shaft, checking its revolutions. The vessel was at once compelled to drop anchor to avoid drifting on the torpedoes or ashore, and afterward had to be docked for the removal of the streamer before she could again use her propeller. The torpedoes, as anchored, floated a few feet below the surface of the water at low tide, and were loaded with one hundred pounds of powder arranged to explode by concussion—the automatic fuse employed being the invention of Capt. Francis D. Lee, an intelligent young engineer officer of my general staff, and now a prominent architect in St. Louis. The fuse or firing apparatus consisted of a cylindrical lead tube with a hemispherical head, the metal in the head being thinner than at the sides. The tube was open at the lower extremity, where it was surrounded by a flange; and, when in place, it was protected against leakage by means of brass couplings and rubber washers. It was charged as follows: In its centre was a glass tube filled with sulphuric acid and hermetically sealed. This was guarded by another glass tube sealed in like manner, and both were retained in position by means of a peculiar pin at the open end of the leaden tube; the space between the latter and the glass tube was then filled with a composition of chlorate of potassa and powdered loaf sugar, with a quantity of rifle powder. The lower part of the tube was then closed with a piece of oiled paper. Great care had to be taken to ascertain that the leaden tube was perfectly water-tight under considerable pressure. The torpedo also had to undergo the most careful test. The firing of the tube was produced by bringing the thin head in contact with a hard object, as the side of a vessel; the indentation of the lead broke the glass tubes, which discharged the acid on the composition, firing it, and thereby igniting the charge in the torpedo. The charges used

varied from sixty to one hundred pounds rifle powder, though other explosives might have been more advantageously used if they had been available to us. Generally four of the fuses were attached to the head of each torpedo so as to secure the discharge at any angle of attack. These firing tubes or fuses were afterward modified to avoid the great risk consequent upon screwing them in place and of having them permanently attached to the charged torpedo. The shell of the latter was thinned at the point where the tube was attached, so that, under water pressure, the explosion of the tube would certainly break it and discharge the torpedo; though, when unsubmerged, the explosion of the tube would vent itself in the open air without breaking the shell. In this arrangement the tube was of brass, with a leaden head, and made water-tight by means of a screw plug at its base. Both the shell and the tube being made independently water-tight, the screw connection between the two was made loose, so that the tube could be attached or detached readily with the fingers. The mode adopted for testing against leakage was by placing them in a vessel of alcohol, under the glass exhaust of an air-pump. When no air bubbles appeared the tubes could be relied on. Captain Lee had also an electric torpedo which exploded by concussion against a hard object; the electric current being thus established, insured the discharge at the right moment.

Captain Lee is the inventor also of the "spar-torpedo" as an attachment to vessels, now in general use in the Federal navy. It originated as follows: He reported to me that he thought he could blow up successfully any vessel by means of a torpedo carried some five or six feet under water at the end of a pole ten or twelve feet long, which should be attached to the bow of a skiff or row-boat. I authorized an experiment upon the hulk of an unfinished and condemned gunboat anchored in the harbor, and loaded for the purpose with all kinds of rubbish taken from the "burnt district" of the city. It was a complete success; a large hole was made in the side of the hulk, the rubbish being blown high in the air, and the vessel sank in less than a minute.* I then determined

* Since writing the above I have been informed by Captain F. Barrett, United States Navy, that he had invented the same "spar-torpedo" in the first year of the war, but it had not been applied by the Federals. In the spring of 1862, I had also recommended its use to General Lovell for the defence of New Orleans, by arming river boats with it to make night attacks on the enemy's fleet—but it was proposed to use it above water.

to employ this important invention, not only in the defense of Charleston, but to disperse or destroy the Federal blockading fleet by means of one or more small swift steamers, with low decks, and armed only with "spar-torpedoes" as designed by Captain Lee. I sent him at once to Richmond, to urge the matter on the attention of the Confederate Government. He reported his mission as follows:-

"In compliance with your orders, I submitted the drawing of my torpedo and a vessel with which I propose to operate them, to the Secretary of War. While he heartily approved, he stated his inability to act in the matter, as it was a subject that appertained to the navy. He, however, introduced me and urged it to the Secretary of Navy. The Secretary of War could do nothing, and the Secretary of the Navy would not, for the reason that I was not a naval officer under his command. So I returned to Charleston without accomplishing anything. After a lapse of some months I was again sent to Richmond to represent the matter to the Government, and I carried with me the indorsement of the best officers of the navy. The result was the transfer of an unfinished hull, on the stocks at Charleston, which was designed for a gunboat—or rather floating battery, as she was not arranged for any motive power, but was intended to be anchored in position. This hull was completed by me, and a second-hand and much worn engine was obtained in Savannah and placed in her. Notwithstanding her tub-like model and the inefficiency of her engine, Captain Carlin, commanding a blockade-runner, took charge of her in an attack against the New Ironsides. She was furnished with a spar designed to carry three torpedoes of one hundred pounds each. The lateral spars suggested by you, Captain Carlin declined to use, as they would interfere very seriously with the movements of the vessel, which, even without them, could with the utmost difficulty stem the current. The boat was almost entirely submerged, and painted gray like the blockade-runners, and, like them, made no smoke, by burning anthracite coal. The night selected for the attack was very dark, and the New Ironsides was not seen until quite near. Captain Carlin immediately made for her; but her side being oblique to the direction of his approach, he ordered his steersman, who was below deck, to change the course. This order was misunderstood, and, in place of going the "bow on" as was proposed, she ran alongside of the New Ironsides and entangled her spar in the anchor-chain of that vessel. In attempting to back the engine hung on the centre, and some delay occurred before it was pried off. During this critical period Captain Carlin, in answer to threats and inquiries, declared his boat to be the Live Yankee, from Port Royal, with dispatches for the admiral. This deception was not discovered until after Carlin had backed out and his vessel was lost in the darkness."

Shortly after this bold attempt of Captain Carlin, in the summer of 1863, to blow up the New Ironsides, Mr. Theodore Stoney, Dr. Ravenel, and other gentlemen of Charleston, had built a small cigar-shaped boat, which they called the "David." It had been specially planned and constructed to attack this much-dreaded naval Goliath, the New Ironsides. It was about twenty feet long, with a diameter of five feet at its middle, and was propelled by a small screw worked by a diminutive engine. As soon as ready for service, I caused it to be fitted with a "Lee spar-torpedo" charged with seventy-five pounds of powder. Commander W. T. Glassel, a brave and enterprising officer of the Confederate States Navy, took charge of it, and about eight o'clock one hazy night, on the ebb tide, with a crew of one engineer, J. H. Tomb; one fireman, James Sullivan; and a pilot, J. W. Cannon; he fearlessly set forth from Charleston on his perilous mission—the destruction of the New Ironsides. I may note that this ironclad steamer threw a great deal more metal, at each broadside, than all the monitors together of the fleet; her fire was delivered with more rapidity and accuracy, and she was the most effective vessel employed in the reduction of Battery Wagner.

The "David" reached the New Ironsides about ten o'clock P. M., striking her with a torpedo about six feet under water, but fortunately for that steamer she received the shock against one of her inner bulk-heads, which saved her from destruction. The water, however, being thrown up in large volume, half-filled her little assailant and extinguished its fires. It then drifted out to sea with the current, under a heavy grape and musketry fire from the much alarmed crew of the New Ironsides. Supposing the "David" disabled, Glassel and his men jumped into the sea to swim ashore; but after remaining in the water about one hour he was picked up by the boat of a Federal transport schooner, whence he was transferred to the guardship "Ottawa," lying outside of the rest of the fleet. He was ordered at first, by Admiral Dahlgren, to be ironed, and in case of resistance, to be double ironed; but through the intercession of his friend, Captain W. D. Whiting, commanding the Ottawa, he was released on giving his parole not to attempt to escape from the ship. The fireman, Sullivan, had taken refuge on the rudder of the New Ironsides, where he was discovered, put in irons and kept in a dark cell until sent with

not true ✕ Glassel to New York, to be tried and hung, as reported by Northern newspapers, for using an engine of war not recognized by civilized nations. But the government of the United States has now a torpedo corps, intended specially to study and develop that important branch of the military service. After a captivity of many months in Forts Lafayette and Warren, Glassel and Sullivan were finally exchanged for the captain and a sailor of the Federal steamer "Isaac Smith," a heavily-armed gunboat which was captured in the Stono river, with its entire crew of one hundred and thirty officers and men, by a surprise I had prepared, with field artillery only, placed in ambuscade along the river bank, and under whose fire the Federal gunners were unable to man and use their powerful guns. Captain Glassel's other two companions, Engineer Tomb and Pilot Cannon, after swimming about for a while, espied the David still afloat, drifting with the current; they betook themselves to it, re-lit the fires from its bull's-eye lantern, got up steam and started back for the city; they had to repass through the fleet and they received the fire of several of its monitors and guard-boats, fortunately without injury. With the assistance of the flood tide they returned to their point of departure, at the Atlantic wharf, about midnight, after having performed one of the most daring feats of the war. The New Ironsides never fired another shot after this attack upon her. She remained some time at her anchorage off Morris Island, evidently undergoing repairs; she was then towed to Port Royal, probably to fit her for her voyage to Philadelphia, where she remained until destroyed by fire after the war.

Nearly about the time of the attack upon the New Ironsides by the David, Mr. Horace L. Hunley, formerly of New Orleans, but then living in Mobile, offered me another torpedo-boat of a different description, which had been built with his private means. It was shaped like a fish, made of galvanized iron, was twenty feet long, and at the middle three and a half feet wide by five deep. From its shape it came to be known as the "fish torpedo-boat." Propelled by a screw worked from the inside by seven or eight men, it was so contrived that it could be submerged and worked under water for several hours, and to this end was provided with a fin on each side, worked also from the interior. By depressing the points of these fins the boat, when in motion, was made to descend,

and by elevating them it was made to rise. Light was afforded through the means of bull's-eyes placed in the man-holes. Lieut. Payne, Confederate States Navy, having volunteered with a crew from the Confederate Navy, to man the fish-boat for another attack upon the New Ironsides, it was given into their hands for that purpose. While tied to the wharf at Fort Johnston, whence it was to start under cover of night to make the attack, a steamer passing close by capsized and sunk it. Lieut. Payne, who at the time was standing in one of the man-holes, jumped out into the water, which, rushing into the two openings, drowned two men then within the body of the boat. After the recovery of the sunken boat Mr. Hunley came from Mobile, bringing with him Lieutenant Dixon, of the Alabama volunteers, who had successfully experimented with the boat in the harbor of Mobile, and under him another naval crew volunteered to work it. As originally designed, the torpedo was to be dragged astern upon the surface of the water; the boat, approaching the broadside of the vessel to be attacked, was to dive beneath it, and, rising to the surface beyond, continue its course, thus bringing the floating torpedo against the vessel's side, when it would be discharged by a trigger contrived to go off by the contact. Lieutenant Dixon made repeated descents in the harbor of Charleston, diving under the naval receiving ship which lay at anchor there. But one day when he was absent from the city Mr. Hunley, unfortunately, wishing to handle the boat himself, made the attempt. It was readily submerged, but did not rise again to the surface, and all on board perished from asphyxiation. When the boat was discovered, raised and opened, the spectacle was indescribably ghastly; the unfortunate men were contorted into all kinds of horrible attitudes; some clutching candles, evidently endeavoring to force open the man-holes; others lying in the bottom tightly grappled together, and the blackened faces of all presented the expression of their despair and agony. After this tragedy I refused to permit the boat to be used again; but Lieutenant Dixon, a brave and determined man, having returned to Charleston, applied to me for authority to use it against the Federal steam sloop-of-war Housatonic, a powerful new vessel, carrying eleven guns of the largest calibre, which lay at the time in the north channel opposite Beach Inlet, materially obstructing the passage of our blockade-runners

tragedy
all were drowned

in and out. At the suggestion of my chief-of-staff, Gen. Jordan, I consented to its use for this purpose, not as a submarine machine, but in the same manner as the *David*. As the *Housatonic* was easily approached through interior channels from behind Sullivan's Island, and Lieutenant Dixon readily procured a volunteer crew, his little vessel was fitted with a Lee spar torpedo, and the expedition was undertaken. Lieutenant Dixon, acting with characteristic coolness and resolution, struck and sunk the *Housatonic* on the night of February 17, 1864; but unhappily, from some unknown cause, the torpedo boat was also sunk, and all with it lost. Several years since a "diver," examining the wreck of the *Housatonic*, discovered the fish-boat lying alongside of its victim.

From the commencement of the siege of Charleston I had been decidedly of the opinion that the most effective as well as least costly method of defence against the powerful iron-clad steamers and monitors originated during the late war, was to use against them small but swift steamers of light draught, very low decks, and hulls iron-clad down several feet below the water-line; these boats to be armed with a spar-torpedo (on Captain Lee's plan), to thrust out from the bow at the moment of collision, being inclined to strike below the enemy's armor, and so arranged that the torpedo could be immediately renewed from within for another attack; all such boats to be painted gray like the blockade-runners, and, when employed, to burn anthracite coal, so as to make no smoke. But unfortunately I had not the means to put the system into execution. Soon after the first torpedo attack, made, as related, by the *David* upon the *New Ironsides*, I caused a number of boats and barges to be armed with spar-torpedoes for the purpose of attacking in detail the enemy's gunboats resorting to the sounds and harbors along the South Carolina coast. But, the Federals having become very watchful, surrounded their steamers at night with nettings and floating booms to prevent the torpedo boats from coming near enough to do them any injury. Even in the outer harbor of Charleston, where the blockaders and their consorts were at anchor, the same precaution was observed in calm weather.

The anchoring of the large torpedoes in position was attended with considerable danger. While planting them at the mouth of the Cooper and Ashley rivers (which form the peninsula of the

city of Charleston), the steamer engaged in that duty being swung around by the returning tide, struck and exploded one of the torpedoes just anchored. The steamer sank immediately, but, fortunately, the tide being low and the depth of water not great, no lives were lost. In 1863-4, Jacksonville, Florida, having been evacuated by the Confederates, then too weak to hold it longer, the Federal gunboats frequently ran up the St. John's river many miles, committing depredations along its banks. To stop these proceedings I sent a party from Charleston under a staff officer, Captain Pliny Bryan, to plant torpedoes in the channels of that stream. The result was the destruction of several large steamers and a cessation of all annoyance on the part of the others. In the bay of Charleston and adjacent streams I had planted about one hundred and twenty-five torpedoes and some fifty more in other parts of my department. The first torpedoes used in the late war were placed in the James river, below Richmond, by General G. R. Raines, who became afterward chief of the Torpedo Bureau. Mr. Barbarin, of New Orleans, placed also successfully a large number of torpedoes in Mobile bay and its vicinity.

To show the important results obtained by the use of torpedoes by the Confederates and the importance attached, now, at the North to that mode of warfare, I will quote here the following remarks from an able article in the last September number of the *Galaxy*, entitled, "Has the Day of Great Navies Past?" The author says: "The real application of submarine warfare dates from the efforts of the Confederates during the late war. In October, 1862, a 'torpedo bureau' was established at Richmond, which made rapid progress in the construction and operations of these weapons until the close of the war in 1865. Seven Union iron-clads, eleven wooden war vessels, and six army transports were destroyed by Southern torpedoes, and many more were seriously damaged. This destruction occurred, for the most part, during the last two years of the war, and it is suggestive to think what might have been the influence on the Union cause if the Confederate practice of submarine warfare had been nearly as efficient at the commencement as it was at the close of the war. It is not too much to say, respecting the blockade of the Southern ports, that if not altogether broken up, it would have been rendered so inefficient as to have commanded no respect from European powers, while the

command of rivers, all important to the Union forces as bases of operations, would have been next to impossible.

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"Think of the destruction this infernal machine effected, and bear in mind its use came to be fairly understood, and some system introduced into its arrangement, only during the last part of the war. During a period when scarcely any vessels were lost, and very few severely damaged by the most powerful guns then employed in actual war, we find this long list of disasters from the use of this new and, in the beginning, much despised comer into the arena of naval warfare. But it required just such a record as this to arouse naval officers to ask themselves the question, 'Is not the days of great navies gone forever?' If such comparatively rude and improvised torpedoes made use of by the Confederates caused such damage and spread such terror among the Union fleet, what will be the consequence when skillful engineers, encouraged by governments, as they have never been before, diligently apply themselves to the perfecting of this terrible weapon? The successes of the Confederates have made the torpedo, which before was looked on with loathing—a name not to be spoken except contemptuously—a recognized factor in modern naval warfare. On all sides we see the greatest activity in improving it."

I shall now refer briefly to the use in Charleston harbor of rifle-cannon and iron-clad floating and land batteries. In the attack on Fort Sumter, in 1861, these war appliances were first used in the United States. When I arrived at Charleston, in March of that year, to assume command of the forces there assembling and direct the attack on Fort Sumter, I found under construction a rough floating battery made of palmetto logs, under the direction
+ of Captain Hamilton, an ex-United States naval officer. He intended to plate it with several sheets of rolled iron, each about three-quarters of an inch thick, and to arm it with four 32-pounder carronades. He and his battery were so much ridiculed, however, that he could with difficulty obtain any further assistance from the State government. He came to me in great discouragement, and expressed in vivid terms his certainty of success, and of revolutionizing future naval warfare as well as the construction of war vessels. I approved of Captain Hamilton's design, and having secured the necessary means, instructed him to finish his battery

+ Jas H. Trapier was the inventor. Beauregard is very much interested.

at the earliest moment practicable. This being accomplished before the attack on Fort Sumter opened, early in April I placed the floating battery in position at the western extremity of Sullivan's Island to enfilade certain barbette guns of the fort which could not be reached effectively by our land batteries. It therefore played an important part in that brief drama of thirty-three hours, receiving many shots without any serious injury. About one year later, in Hampton Roads, the Merrimac, plated and roofed with two layers of railroad iron, met the Monitor in a momentous encounter, which first attracted the attention of the civilized world to the important change that iron-plating or "armors" would thenceforth create in naval architecture and armaments. The one and a half to two-inch plating used on Captain Hamilton's floating battery has already grown to about twelve inches thickness of steel plates of the best quality, put together with the utmost care, in the effort to resist the heaviest rifle-shots now used. About the same time that Captain Hamilton was constructing his floating battery, Mr. C. H. Steven^s of Charleston, (who afterward died a brigadier-general at the battle of Chickamauga,) commenced building an iron-clad land battery at Cumming's Point, the northern extremity of Morris Island and the point nearest to Fort Sumter—that is, about thirteen hundred yards distant. This battery was to be built of heavy timbers covered with one layer of railroad iron, the rails well-fitted into each other, presenting an inclined, smooth surface of about thirty-five degrees to the fire of Sumter; the surface was to be well greased and the guns were to fire through small embrasures supplied with strong iron shutters. I approved also of the plan, making such suggestions as my experience as an engineer warranted. This battery took an active part in the attack and was struck several times; but excepting the jamming and disabling one of the shutters, the battery remained uninjured to the end of the fight.

From Cumming's Point also, and in the same attack, was used the first rifled cannon fired in America. The day before I received orders from the Confederate Government, at Montgomery, to demand the evacuation or surrender of Fort Sumter, a vessel from England arriving in the outer harbor, signalled that she had something important for the Governor of the State. I sent out a harbor boat, which returned with a small Blakely rifled-gun, of

+ how false!
+ means!

two and a half inches diameter, with only fifty rounds of ammunition. I placed it at once behind a sand-bag parapet next to the Steven battery, where it did opportune service with its ten-pound shell while the ammunition lasted. The penetration of the projectiles into the brick masonry of the fort was not great at that distance, but the piece had great accuracy, and several of the shells entered the embrasures facing Morris Island. One of the officers of the garrison remarked after the surrender, that when they first heard the singular whizzing, screeching sound of the projectile, they did not understand its cause until one of the unexploded shells being found in the fort the mystery was solved. As a proof of the rapid strides taken by the artillery arm of the service, I shall mention that two years later the Federals fired against Fort Sumter, from nearly the same spot, rifle projectiles weighing three hundred pounds. Meantime I had received from England two other Blakely rifled cannon of thirteen and a quarter inches calibre. These magnificent specimens of heavy ordnance were, apart from their immense size, different in construction from any thing I had ever seen. They had been bored through from muzzle to breech; the breech was then plugged with a brass block extending into the bore at least two feet, and into which had been reamed a chamber about eighteen inches in length and six in diameter, while the vent entered the bore immediately in advance of this chamber. The projectiles provided were shells weighing, when loaded, about three hundred and fifty pounds, and solid cylindrical shots, weighing seven hundred and thirty pounds; the charge for the latter was sixty pounds of powder. The first of these guns received was mounted in a battery specially constructed for it at "The Battery," at the immediate mouth of Cooper river, to command the inner harbor. As no instructions for their service accompanied the guns, and the metal between the exterior surface of the breech and the rear of the inner chamber did not exceed six to eight inches, against all experience in ordnance, apprehensions were excited that the gun would burst in firing with so large a charge and such weight of projectile. Under the circumstances it was determined to charge it with an empty shell and the minimum of powder necessary to move it; the charge was divided in two cartridges, one to fit the small rear chamber and the other the main bore. The gun was fired by means of a long lanyard from

the bomb-proof attached to the battery; and, as apprehended, it burst at the first fire, even with the relatively small charge used; the brass plug was found started back at least the sixteenth of an inch, splitting the breech with three or four distinct cracks and rendering it useless.

With such a result I did not attempt, of course, to mount and use the other, but assembled a board of officers to study the principle that might be involved in the peculiar construction, and to make experiments generally with ordnance. The happy results of the extensive experiments made by this board with many guns of different calibre, including muskets, and last of all with the other Blakely, was that if the cartridge were not pressed down to the bottom of the bore of a gun, and a space were thus left in rear of the charge, as great a velocity could be imparted to the projectile with a much smaller charge and the gun was subject to less abrupt strain from the explosion, because this air-chamber, affording certain room for the expansion of the gases, gave time for the inertia of the heavy mass of the projectile to be overcome before the full explosion of the charge, and opportunity was also given for the ignition of the entire charge, so that no powder was wasted as in ordinary gunnery. When this was discovered the remaining Blakely was tried from a skid, without any cartridge in the rear chamber. It fired both projectiles, shell and solid shot, with complete success, notwithstanding the small amount of metal at the extremity of the breech. I at once utilized this discovery. We had a number of 8-inch columbiads (remaining in Charleston after the capture of Sumter in 1861) which contained a powder-chamber of smaller diameter than the calibre of the gun. The vent in rear of this powder-chamber was plugged, and a new vent opened in advance of the powder chamber, leaving the latter to serve as an air-chamber, as in our use of the Blakely gun. They were then rifled and banded, and thus turned into admirable guns, which were effectively employed against the Federal iron-clads. I am surprised that the new principle adapted to these guns has not been used for the heavy ordnance of the present day, as it would secure great economy in weight and cost. The injured Blakely gun was subsequently thoroughly repaired, and made as efficient as when first received.

In the year 1854, while in charge as engineer of the fortifications of Louisiana, I attended a target practice with heavy guns by the garrison of Fort Jackson, on the Mississippi river, the object fired at being a hogshead floating with the current at the rate of about four and a half miles an hour. I was struck with the difficulties of trailing or traversing the guns—42-pounders and 8-inch columbiads—and with the consequent inaccuracy of the firing. Reflecting upon the matter, I devised soon afterward a simple method of overcoming the difficulty by the application of a "rack and lever" to the wheels of the chassis of the guns; and I sent drawings of the improvement to the Chief of Engineers, General Totten, who referred them, with his approval, to the Chief of Ordnance. In the course of a few weeks the latter informed me that his department had not yet noticed any great obstacle in traversing guns on moving objects, and therefore declined to adopt my invention. When charged in 1861 with the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, I described this device to several of my engineer and artillery officers; but before I could have it applied I was ordered to Virginia to assume command of the Confederate force then assembling at Manassas. Afterward, on my return to Charleston in 1862, one of my artillery officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, an intelligent and zealous soldier, applied this principle (modified, however,) to one of the heavy guns in the harbor with such satisfactory results that I gave him orders to apply it as rapidly as possible to all guns of that class which we then had mounted. By April 6, 1863, when Admiral Dupont made his attack on Fort Sumter with seven monitors, the New Ironsides, several gunboats and mortar boats, our heaviest pieces had this traversing apparatus adapted to their chassis, and the result realized fully our expectations. However slow or fast the Federal vessels moved in their evolutions, they received a steady and unerring fire, which at first disconcerted them, and at last gave us a brilliant victory—disabling five of the monitors, one of which, the Keokuk, sunk at her anchors that night. It is pertinent for me professionally to remark that had this Federal naval attack on Fort Sumter of the 6th of April, 1863, been made at night, while the fleet could have easily approached near enough to see the fort—a large, lofty object, covering several acres—the monitors, which were relatively so small and low on the water, could not have been seen from the

fort. It would have been impossible, therefore, for the latter to have returned with any accuracy the fire of the fleet, and this plan of attack could have been repeated every night until the walls of the fort should have crumbled under the enormous missiles, which made holes two and a half feet deep in the wall, and shattered the latter in an alarming manner. I could not then have repaired during the day the damages of the night, and I am confident now, as I was then, that Fort Sumter, if thus attacked, must have been disabled and silenced in a few days. Such a result at that time would have been necessarily followed by the evacuation of Morris and Sullivan's Islands, and, soon after, of Charleston itself, for I had not yet had time to complete and arm the system of works, including James Island and the inner harbor, which enabled us six months later to bid defiance to Admiral Dahlgren's powerful fleet and Gilmore's strong land forces.

A Review of the First Two Days' Operations at Gettysburg and a Reply to General Longstreet by General Fitz. Lee.

[Even if his gallant services and military reputation did not entitle him to speak, we are sure that our readers will be glad to have the following paper from one so closely allied to our great Commander-in-Chief.]

The "great battle of Gettysburg" has always occupied a prominent position in the mind of the Confederate soldier. This surpassing interest is due from the fact that there prevails, throughout the South, a wide-spread impression that had the plans of the Southern chieftain been fully endorsed, entered into, and carried out by his corps commanders, the historic "rebel yell" of triumph would have resounded along Cemetery Ridge upon that celebrated 2d July, 1863, and re-echoing from the heights of Round Top, might have been heard and heeded around the walls of Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. There is a ghastliness about that picture of the struggle at Gettysburg, that the blood of the heroes who perished there serves but to increase; and over that splendid scene of human courage and human sacrifice, there arises like the ghost of Banquo at Macbeth's banquet, a dreadful apparition, which says that the battle was lost to the Southern troops because "some one blundered." Military critics, foreign and native, have differed as to the individual responsibility of what was practically a Confederate defeat. The much-abused cavalry is lifted into great prominence and is constrained to feel complimented by the statement of many of these critics that the failure to crush the Federal army in Pennsylvania in 1863 can be expressed "in five words" (General Heth, in a late paper to the *Philadelphia Times*), viz: "the absence of our cavalry;" but such language implies an accusation against General J. E. B. Stuart, its commander, who has been charged with a neglect of duty in not reporting the passage of the Potomac by Hooker's army (afterwards Meade's), and with disobedience of orders, which resulted in placing the Federal army between his command and the force of General Lee, thereby putting out the eyes of his own "giant." There are those who bring our troubles to the door and cast them at the feet of General Ewell, the gallant commander of the Second corps, who is charged with not obeying his chief's orders, by following

up his success and occupying Cemetery Heights upon the afternoon of July 1st.

Others confidently agree with Colonel Taylor, General Lee's adjutant-general, that "General Longstreet was fairly chargeable with tardiness" on the 2nd July, in not making his attack earlier; and again it is stated, that his charging column upon the 3rd, which moved so magnificently to assault the positions of the Federals, was not composed of all the troops General Lee designed should be placed in it.

And last, but by no means least, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief himself is now for the first time charged with everything relating to the disaster of Gettysburg, and the whole accountability for the results of the battle are pointedly placed upon his shoulders by one of his subordinates, in a paper prepared for the *Philadelphia Times*. To whom, therefore, it may be asked, can the loss of the battle of Gettysburg be properly attributed—to Stuart, or Ewell, or Longstreet, or to General Lee? Very many of us who are deeply interested in the subject may honorably differ as to that, but upon the splendid courage displayed by the rank and file of the Confederate army upon those three first days in July, 1863, wherever tested, the world unites in perfect harmony.

We were indeed "within a stone's throw of peace" at Gettysburg—and although in numbers as 62,000* is to 105,000, before any portion of either army had become engaged—yet the advantages were so manifestly on General Lee's side in consequence of the more rapid concentration of his troops upon a common point, that the heart of every Southern soldier beat with the lofty confidence of certain victory.

Any new light, therefore, thrown upon the matter in discussion, should be well-sifted before permitting it to shine for the benefit of the future historian, less it dazzle by false rays the sympathetic minds of generations yet to come.

The *Philadelphia Times* of November 3rd, 1877, in commenting upon some additional points furnished that paper by General Longstreet as an addenda to his article published in the same issue, says:

*Walter Taylor.—The Federal force is overestimated. Their total of all arms was about 90,000. General Humphreys puts, in a letter to me, the Federal infantry at 70,000, inclusive of 5,000 officers.

"The letter from General Longstreet which accompanies these enclosures, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand. It is that while General Lee on the battle-field assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame, but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle, Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits."

Whilst claiming the same privilege as a Confederate soldier, I, yet, would not have exercised it, being only a cavalryman, who added to his "jingling spur" not even a "bright sabretache," but only a poor record, were it not my good fortune to have known long and intimately the Commander-in-Chief, and to have conversed with him frequently during and since the war, upon the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia.

First then, let us examine the charge that the battle of Gettysburg was lost by the "absence of our cavalry." The cavalry of General Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign consisted of the brigades of Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee's (under Chambliss), Beverly Robertson, Wm. E. Jones, Imboden, and Jenkins, with a battalion under Colonel White. The first three named accompanied Stuart on his circuit around the Federal army, reaching Gettysburg on the 2nd of July—Jones and Robertson were left to hold the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and did not get to the vicinity of Gettysburg until after the battles; so that of all the force I enumerate, Jenkins' brigade and White's battalion alone crossed the Potomac with the army. (Imboden's command was detached along the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, and was not in the fight at Gettysburg). Stuart after fighting at Brandy Station, on the 9th of June, a large body of Federal cavalry supported by infantry, and forcing them to recross the Rappahannock river with a loss (to them) of "four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors," (General Lee's report), marched into Loudoun county upon the right flank of the army, and was engaged in a series of conflicts, terminating with Pleasonton's cavalry corps and Barnes' division of infantry, upon the 21st June, which caused him to retire to the vicinity of Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, *our infantry* being upon the western side of the mountains.

Leaving the brigade before mentioned to hold the position, Stuart then, in the exercise of a *discretion* given him by General Lee and so stated in his report, determined to pass to the rear of the Federal army and cross the Potomac at Seneca Falls, a point between that army and their capital. Thus, it will be seen, including the brigade and battalion of cavalry which composed the vanguard of the army, that *over one-half* of the cavalry was left in position to be used by General Lee.

Hooker, in his dispatch to his President, June 21st, (Report on the Conduct of the War, volume 1, page 279,) referring to Stuart's command, says: "This cavalry force has hitherto prevented me from obtaining satisfactory information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; they had masked all their movements." General Hooker had reference to the five brigades holding the country between his army and the marching column of General Lee—Jenkins being in front of the advanced corps (Ewell's) with Colonel White's battalion, in addition to his own command. The cavalry corps, by the return of May 31st, 1863, numbered 9,536. According to a letter from Major McClellan, Stuart's A. A. G., this force was divided about as follows: Hampton, 1,200; Fitz. Lee, 2,000; W. H. F. Lee, 1,800; Jones, 3,500; Robertson, 1,000. It is proper to state that the figures above refer to the enlisted men present for duty. The total effective strength (inclusive of officers) numbered, according to Walter Taylor, at that date, 10,292. (I am satisfied, from a conversation with General Robertson, that McClellan overestimates the number of men in Jones' brigade, and therefore underestimates the number in some of the other brigades.) There is no authenticated return after the above date until August. After the return above cited, the losses at Brandy Station fight, the three days fighting in Loudoun, the encounter at Westminster, Maryland, Hanover, Pennsylvania, and other points, occurred, together with the usual reduction of mounted troops from long and rapid marching. It is proper to say that the return quoted did not include the commands of Jenkins, Imboden, or White. General Stuart, in his report (August No., 1876, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, p. 76.) estimated Jenkins' brigade, on leaving Virginia, at 3,800 troopers. I think this number is probably a misprint; from the best information I can get, this brigade numbered at that time 1,600. (See Rodes' official

report.) Adding this last number to 4,500, (McClellan's estimate of Robertson's and Jones' brigade,) and putting White's battalion at 200, the result is a cavalry force of 6,300 doing duty for the main army, and greater in numerical strength than the three brigades Stuart carried with him, which at Gettysburg numbered less than 4,000. Whilst not endorsing Stuart's march as the best movement under the circumstances, I assert that he had the Commanding-General's permission to make it; (General Lee's report, *Southern Historical Society Papers* for July, 1876, page 43;) that it involved a loss of material and men to the enemy and drew Kilpatrick's and Gregg's divisions of cavalry from their aggressive attitude on Mead's flank and front, leaving only Buford's to watch for the advance of our troops, and hence we find only his two brigades in the Federal front on the first of July; that it kept the Sixth Federal corps, some 15,000 men, from reaching Gettysburg until after 3 P. M. on the 2nd of July; that it caused General Meade to send General French to Frederick, to protect his communications, with from 5,000 to 7,000 men, (the latter figure is Walter Taylor's estimate, page 113, "Four Years with General Lee,") and prevented that body of troops from being made use of in other ways—which force, Butterfield says, Hooker (before being relieved) contemplated throwing, with Slocum's corps, in General Lee's rear; and finally, that there was inflicted a loss upon the enemy's cavalry of confessedly near 5,000. (Stuart's report, p. 76, August No., 1876, *Southern Historical Society Papers*.) The Federal army crossed the Potomac upon the 26th June. General Lee heard it on the night of the 28th, from a scout, and not from his cavalry commander. Stuart crossed between the Federal army and Washington on the night of the 27th, and necessarily, from his position, could not communicate with General Lee. He sent information about the march of Hancock towards the river, and after that was not in position to do more. The boldness of General Lee's offensive strategy, in throwing his army upon one side of the Potomac whilst leaving his adversary upon the other, made it particularly necessary for him to know the movements of the Federal army. Stuart, with his experience, activity, and known ability for such work, should have kept interposed always between the Federal army and his own, and whilst working close on Meade's lines, have been in direct communication with

his own army commander. It is well known that General Lee loitered, after crossing the Potomac, because he was ignorant of the movements and position of his antagonist. For the same reason he groped in the dark at Gettysburg. From the 25th of June to July 2d, General Lee deplored Stuart's absence, and almost hourly wished for him, and yet it was by his permission his daring chief of cavalry was away. General Stuart cannot, therefore, be charged with the responsibility of the failure at Gettysburg. Did such failure arise from Ewell and Hill not pushing their success on the 1st of July? I have always been one of those who regarded it a great misfortune that these two corps commanders did not continue to force the fighting upon that day. Each had two divisions of their corps engaged, thus leaving one division to each corps, viz., Johnson of Ewell's, and Anderson of Hill's, at their service for further work—something over 10,000 men. The four divisions engaged upon the Confederate side in the battle amounted to about 22,000. The loss after the repulse of the enemy, in Early's division, amounted to 586, (Early's review of Gettysburg, December number of *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 1877, page 257,) leaving him still about 4,500 fighting men. Heth says, (see his paper in *Philadelphia Times*, September 22d, 1877,) he went into that fight with 7,000 muskets, and lost 2,700 men killed and wounded. He was still left with 4,300. Estimating those four divisions, at the close of the action, at an average of 4,500 men apiece, we had 18,000 men; add the 10,000 of the two divisions not engaged, and there will be found 28,000 men ready to move on, flushed with victory and confident of success. General Early, in a letter to me, places the effective force in Ewell's and Hill's corps, on the morning of the 2nd, at 26,000 men. Upon the Federal side there had been engaged the First and Eleventh corps, (save one brigade, Smith's of Steinwehr's division, left on Cemetery Hill as a reserve,) and Buford's two brigades of cavalry. As bearing directly upon this portion of the subject, I give a letter from Major General Hancock, and also one from Colonel Bachelder. (The latter remained on the field of Gettysburg for eighty-four days after the battle, making sketches and collecting data, and has since visited the field with over 1,000 commissioned officers who were engaged, forty-seven of them being Generals Commanding. General Hancock writes of him to General Humphrey's: "Mr. Bachel-

der's long study of the field has given him a fund of accurate information in great detail, which I believe is not possessed by any one else.")

Letter from General Winfield Hancock.

NEW YORK, *January 17th, 1878.*

MY DEAR GENERAL:

I am in receipt of yours of the 14th inst., and in reply have to say, that in my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1st July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill. After I had arrived upon the field, assumed the command, and made my dispositions for defending that point (say 4 P. M.), I do not think the Confederate force then present could have carried it. I felt certain at least of my ability to hold it until night, and sent word to that effect back to General Meade, who was then at Taneytown. Please notice the following extract from my testimony before the committee on the "Conduct of the War" on that point—Vol. 1, page 405, March 22nd, 1864:

"When I arrived and took the command, I extended the lines. I sent General Wadsworth to the right to take possession of Culp's Hill with his division. I directed General Geary, whose division belonged to the Twelfth corps, (its commander, General Slocum, not then having arrived,) to take possession of the high ground towards Round Top.

"I made such disposition as I thought wise and proper. The enemy evidently believing that we were reinforced, or that our whole army was there, discontinued their (?) great efforts, and the battle for that day was virtually over. There was firing of artillery and skirmishing all along the front, but that was the end of that day's battle. By verbal instructions, and in the order which I had received from General Meade, I was directed to report, after having arrived on the ground, whether it would be necessary or wise to continue to fight the battle at Gettysburg, or whether it was possible for the fight to be had on the ground Gen. Meade had selected. About 4 o'clock P. M. I sent word by Maj. Mitchell, aide-de-camp, to General Meade, that I would hold the ground until dark, meaning to allow him time to decide the matter for himself.

"As soon as I had gotten matters arranged to my satisfaction, and saw that the troops were being formed again, and I felt secure, I wrote a note to General Meade, and informed him of my views of the ground at Gettysburg. I told him that the only disadvantage which I thought it had was that it could be readily turned

by way of Emmettsburg, and that the roads were clear for any movement he might make. I had ordered all the trains back, as I came up, to clear the roads."

When I arrived upon the field, about 3 P. M., or between that and 3:30, I found the fighting about over—the rear of our troops were hurrying through the town pursued by the Confederates. There had been an attempt to reform some of the Eleventh corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been very successful. I presume there may have been 1,000 to 1,200 at most, organized troops of that corps, in position on the hill. Buford's cavalry, in a solid formation, was showing a firm front in the plain just below (in line of battalions in mass, it is my recollection) Cemetery Hill, to the left of the Taneytown road.

I at once sent Wadsworth's division of the First corps, and a battery of artillery, to take post on Culp's Hill, on our right. The remainder of the First corps I placed on the right and left of the Taneytown road, connecting with the left of the Eleventh corps. These were the troops already on the battle-field when I had arrived and had made my dispositions.

About the time the above-described dispositions were made, Williams' division of the Twelfth army corps came upon the field and took position to the right and rear of Wadsworth's division of the First corps, and, subsequently, Geary's division of the Twelfth corps arriving, I caused it to move to our left and occupy the higher ground towards Round Top, to prevent any local turning of my left, (feeling safe as to the front).

You will perceive that up to the time I transferred the command of our forces on the field to my senior, Major-General Slocum, who arrived there between 6 and 7 o'clock P. M., these two divisions of his corps (Williams' and Geary's) were all the fresh troops that had actually marched on the battle-field.

Please see, on this point, the following extract from my official report of that battle:

* * * * *

"At this time the First and Eleventh corps were retiring through the town closely pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm position on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. The Third corps had not yet arrived from Emmettsburg.

"Orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position, just on the southern edge of Gettysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the Emmettsburg and Taneytown roads, and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied, on my arrival, by direction of Major-General Howard.

"Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery.

"In forming the line I received material assistance from Major-General Howard, Brigadier-General Warren, Brigadier-General Buford, and officers of General Howard's command.

"As soon as the line of battle mentioned above was shown by the enemy, Wadsworth's division, First corps, and a battery, (thought to be the Fifth Maine,) were placed on the eminence just across the turnpike, and commanding completely this approach. This important position was held by the division during the remainder of the operations near Gettysburg.

"The rest of the First corps, under Major-General Doubleday, was on the right and left of the Taneytown road, and connected with the left of the Eleventh corps, which occupied that part of Cemetery Hill immediately to the right and left of the Baltimore turnpike.

"A division of the Twelfth corps, under Brigadier-General Williams, arrived as these arrangements were being completed, and was established, by order of Major-General Slocum, some distance to the right and rear of Wadsworth's division.

"Brigadier-General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps arriving on the ground subsequently and not being able to communicate with Major-General Slocum, I ordered the division to the high ground to the right of and near Round Top mountain, commanding the Gettysburg and Emmettsburg road, as well as the Gettysburg and Taneytown road to our rear."

* * * * *

The Third corps, however, was in close proximity, coming up on the Emmettsburg road, and a portion of it arrived upon the field before night. The Second corps did not reach the field that evening, only because I halted it about three miles in rear of Gettysburg, where an important road came in from the direction of Emmettsburg, to prevent any turning of the left of our army, in case General Lee should make any movement of that nature on the evening of the 1st, or early on the morning of the 2d. I consider

that, had a prolonged struggle taken place that evening (after the dispositions which I have already described as having been made by me), portions at least, of both the Second and Third corps, might have been brought forward in time to have taken part in it. For a sudden assault or a brief contest, they would not, however, have been available before dark. In reference to the numbers of the First corps, after it had fallen back from in front of the town, and reformed on Cemetery Hill, I have seen a statement in Bates' "Battle of Gettysburg," page 82, fixing them at 2,450 men; but as to the correctness of this estimate, I cannot speak with any certainty.

As to the Eleventh corps, I have already stated that I did not think there were more than 1,000 to 1,200 organized men of that corps in position on Cemetery Hill at the time I arrived there, and these were a portion of Steinwehr's division, which, with the artillery of the corps, was left there by Howard when he marched up in the morning.

In reference to the numbers of the Second, Third, and Twelfth corps, our returns of June 30th give their strength, "present for duty," as follows:

Second corps,	-	-	-	-	12,088 men.
Third corps,	-	-	-	-	11,799 men.
Twelfth corps,	-	-	-	-	8,056 men.

The Fifth corps came up during the night of the 1st, and morning of 2nd, from Hanover—see following extract from testimony of General S. W. Crawford, who commanded a division in that corps, on that point:

* * * * *

"I was in the rear division of the corps (Fifth), and on the evening of the 1st July I marched through Hanover and along the road through McSherrytown, marching until between two and three o'clock in the morning, and bivouacked at a town called Brushtown; and before dawn on Thursday, the 2nd of July, a staff-officer of General Sykes, then commanding the corps, rode to my headquarters and directed me to march my men, without giving them any coffee, at once to the field. I placed the column in motion and arrived before noon in the rear of the other divisions of the corps."

* * * * *

The Sixth corps was at Manchester on the evening of the 1st, and marched all of that night and until two o'clock P. M. on the 2nd, before it reached the field.

It has been stated "that Steinwehr's division of Howard's corps, on the first day, threw up lunettes around each gun, on Cemetery Hill—solid works of such height and thickness as to defy the most powerful bolts which the enemy could throw against them—with smooth and perfectly level platforms on which the guns could be worked."

This is a great error; there were no works of the kind above described on that field when I arrived there, and all that I saw in the way of "works" were some holes (not deep) dug to sink the wheels and trains of the pieces.

I am, very truly yours,

WINF'D HANCOCK.

To General FITZHUGH LEE, *Richmond, Va.*

Letter from John B. Bachelder, Esq.

You ask, "How many troops would have opposed Hill and Ewell had the attack been continued on the first day?" For reasons already explained, I am not prepared to give, historically, the exact numbers, but I will say that there was but *one* brigade that had not been engaged: Smith's, of Steinwehr's division, which, with one battery remained in reserve on Cemetery Hill; Costar's brigade, of the same division, was sent out to cover the retreat of the Eleventh corps, but was met soon after it emerged from the town by Hoke's and the left of Hays' brigades and repulsed.

There is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery Hill, made within an hour, would have been successful. At the end of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, were covered by stone walls, and under the command and magnetic influence of General Hancock—who in the meantime had reached the field—would, in my opinion, have held the position against any attack from the troops then up.

But at 6 o'clock everything was changed; both armies were reinforced at that hour, and had the battle been renewed after that it would have been by fresh troops on either side, with all the chances of a new battle. At 6 o'clock, Johnson's division entered the town; and Anderson's division might have reached there at the same time if it had been ordered to do so. The head of the Twelfth corps also reached the battle-field at 6 P. M., but not being required at Cemetery Hill, Geary's division was moved to the left to occupy the high land near Round Top, and Williams' division was turned to its right as it moved up the Baltimore pike, crossed Wolf Hill, with orders to seize the high land on the Confederate left, where Johnson's division subsequently spent the night.

If, therefore, Hill and Ewell had renewed the attack at 6 P. M., with their full commands, the two divisions of the Twelfth corps would have been in position to meet it. This, as before remarked, would have been a new phase of the battle, fought by fresh troops, and therefore subject to all the uncertainties of battle; but with strong probabilities in favor of Confederate success. The First corps had been engaged in a long and severe contest, in which it was everywhere beaten and had suffered heavily. The Eleventh corps had also suffered as much, and portions of it were badly demoralized. On the contrary, the Confederate forces would have continued the engagement with the prestige of victory. Several brigades had been badly cut up, but others had fired scarcely a shot, and the presence of General Lee, who had now arrived, would have given a new impulse to the battle. It is probable strong efforts would have been made to hold the position until the troops of the Third and Second corps could be brought up. Although General Sickles reached the field at an earlier hour, only two brigades of his command arrived that night—these reaching the field at sunset. Two brigades were left at Emmetsburg to hold the pass towards Fairfield, and General Humphreys, with two brigades of his division, reached the field at 1 o'clock the next morning. The Second corps was ordered to move up to Gettysburg, but General Hancock met it on the road on his return to Taneytown, where he went to report to General Meade, and not considering its presence necessary, ordered it to go into bivouac. In case of an engagement, however, these troops could hardly have reached the field before nightfall.

By this brief explanation you will see that the best chance for a successful attack was within the first hour, and unquestionably the *great mistake of the battle* was the failure to follow the Union forces through the town, and attack them before they could reform on Cemetery Hill. Lane's and Thomas' brigades, of Pender's division, and Smith's, of Early's division, were at hand for such a purpose, and had fired scarcely a shot. Dole's, Hoke's, and Hays' brigades were in good fighting condition, and several others would have done good service. The artillery was up, and in an admirable position to have covered an assault, which could have been pushed, under cover of the houses, to within a few rods of the Union position.

I have a nominal list of casualties in the First and Eleventh corps, but not at my command at present. If you desire anything additional I shall be pleased to furnish it, if at my disposal.

I am sir, yours with respect,

JNO. B. BACHELDER.

These letters unquestionably show that had we known it at the time, the position on the heights fought for on the 2nd could have been gained on the afternoon of the 1st by continuing without delay the pursuit of the Federals. It will be observed that they also affirm that the success of an attack made by us after an hour's delay would have been involved in doubt. General Hancock says that an attempt had been made "to reform some of the Eleventh corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, but it had not been successful; and that when he arrived there, about 3 P. M., there were only some 1,000 or 1,200 troops on the hill, with Buford's cavalry in front; and that up to 6 P. M. the troops that had been collected from the First and Eleventh corps had only been reinforced by Williams' and Geary's divisions of the Twelfth corps, under Slocum—numbering together by return of June 30th, 8,056.

The number collected in the First corps amounted to 2,450—(Bates, page 82, and also Doubleday's, its commander's, testimony). Of the Eleventh, (see Hancock,) 1,200. Estimating Buford's cavalry at about 2,500, we would have a Federal force, up to 6 P. M., of 14,206,* opposed to our 26,000. Birney's division of the Third

* This includes all troops except those afterwards collected in Eleventh corps in addition to the 1,200 mentioned by General Hancock.

corps (Sickles) were the next troops to arrive; they came up about sunset, less one brigade left at Emmettsburg, and numbered, at that hour, 4,500.

Humphrey's division of that corps did not reach the field until towards midnight—(General Humphreys, in a letter to me). It will be noticed, however, that General Hancock says that portions of the Second and Third corps, had our assault been sudden or the contest brief, would not have been available until dark. If these figures are correct, I am authorized in reaffirming that "a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting," would have gained for us the possession of the heights on the evening of the 1st of July.

On the other hand, General Early, in a masterly review of those operations in the December number *Southern Historical Society Papers*, 1877, gives some strong reasons, which at the time prevented a further advance, made more convincing by the fact of its being well known that he desired to move on after the retreating Federals. I can well imagine that, with the existing doubt as to what portion of the Federal army was then within supporting distance of the First and Eleventh corps, the arrival at a most inopportune moment of what proved to be a false report, that the enemy were advancing on the York road, which would have brought them in the rear of the Confederate troops; the time consumed in investigating the report; the *apparent* strength of the enemy's position; would all combine to make a subordinate commander hesitate to take the responsibility of beginning another battle; more especially as his chief was close at hand. I know, too, how easy it is, in the light of subsequent events, to criticise an officer's action. "Young man, why did you not tell me that before the battle"? General Lee is reported to have said to an officer who was commenting upon some of the movements at Gettysburg, "even as stupid a man as I am can see it all now," illustrates the point.

Being at the commencement of the war Ewell's chief-of-staff, knowing his soldierly qualities, and loving his memory, God forbid that I should utter one word to detract from the splendid record he has left behind him. His corps being more advanced than Hill's after the action was over, and he being the senior officer present, has caused his conduct on the first, in not pursuing the enemy, to

be criticised; of course, after the arrival of his chief, all responsibility was taken from Ewell in not ordering the troops forward—it was assumed by and is to be placed upon General Lee.

While the capture of Cemetery Hill on the 1st would have probably thrown Meade back on the already selected line of Pipe Clay creek, in gaining it we would have shattered the Twelfth corps—possibly portions of two others—and the Federal army offering battle with three or more of its corps beaten, would have been a less formidable antagonist than we found it on the 2d, from Culps' Hill to Round Top. The Confederates, too, would have suffered an additional loss; but the victor, in most instances, loses less in proportion to the vanquished, except in an attack on fortified places. General Hancock, the opposing commander, does not enumerate this as one of those.

To the operations of the 2d of July I now direct attention, not with the view of going over the whole ground, because it has been fully covered by official reports of the higher officers operating there and by recent papers, some of them bearing exhaustively upon the subject, but for the purpose of examining some of the statements contained in General Longstreet's article, written for and published by the *Philadelphia Times* in its issue of November the 3d, 1877. It is charged by persons, particularly from the North, that Longstreet's political apostacy, since the war, has made his comrades forget his services during that period. Upon that point, whilst I believe, as General Lee once said to me in Lexington, (referring to a letter he had received from General Longstreet, asking an endorsement of his political views,) that "General Longstreet has made a great mistake," I concede the conscientious adoption of such opinions by General Longstreet. The fact that he differs widely, and has not acted politically with the great majority of his old comrades since the war, has nothing to do with his undoubted ability as a soldier during the contest. I saw him for the first time on the 18th of July, 1861, at Blackburn's Ford, on the Bull Run, and was impressed with his insensibility to danger. I recollect well my thinking, there is a man that cannot be stampeded. For the last time I saw him the night before the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, and there was still the bull-dog tenacity, the old genuine *sang froid* about him which made all feel he could be depended upon to hold fast to his

position as long as there was ground to stand upon. These solid characteristics were always displayed by him during the four years of war, and gained for him the soubriquet of "General Lee's old war-horse." But when General Longstreet writes for the public prints a paper which has generally been construed as an attack upon the reputation of General Lee, it will be criticised by a great many; by me, because I find it difficult to reconcile many of his statements with facts in my possession. While there are very few who will deny that General Longstreet was a hard fighter when once engaged, I have never found any one who claimed that he was a brilliant strategist; indeed, upon the only occasions when he exercised an independent command, Suffolk and Knoxville, the results in the public mind were not satisfactory. It is, therefore, with some surprise we learn from his paper that when in Richmond, en route from Suffolk to join General Lee at Fredericksburg, he paused to tell Mr. Seddon (then Secretary of War), how to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. Our astonishment is increased when we read further, that before entering upon the campaign of 1863, he exacted a promise from General Lee that the "campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics, and upon this understanding my (his) assent was given," and that therefore General Lee "gave the order of march." Our wonder culminates when finally we are told that he had a plan to fight the battle different from General Lee's, and that General Lee had since said it would have been successful if adopted.

The invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania was undoubtedly undertaken with a view of manoeuvring the Federal army, then in front of Fredericksburg, to a safer distance from the Confederate capital; to relieve Virginia of the presence of both armies; to subsist our troops upon new ground, that the old might recuperate, and with the idea a decisive battle fought elsewhere might be more productive of substantial results. These premises admitted, not only is gross injustice done to the memory of General Lee, in believing he crossed the Potomac bound fast by a promise to a subordinate to make the movement "strategically offensive, tactically defensive," as charged by General Longstreet, but such reported promise contains a positive reflection upon General Lee's military sagacity. As well might the Czar of Russia, acting as commander-in-chief of his army, have so committed himself to

the Grand Duke Nicholas, or under like circumstances, the Sublime Porte have tied himself up to Osman Pasha, the hero of Plevna. The truth is, General Lee and his army were full of fight, their "objective point" was the Federal army of the Potomac, and "those people" the Confederate chief had resolved to strike whenever and wherever the best opportunity occurred, "strategically offensive and tactically defensive," to the contrary notwithstanding. An army of invasion is naturally an offensive one in strategy and tactics, and history rarely points to an instance where it has been concentrated on a given point to patiently await an attack. The distance from its base making supplies a difficult matter to procure, in itself regulates the whole question.

An army so situated must move or fight. The absurdity of Longstreet's statement is shown in admitting the presumption, General Lee knew all this; nor can we reconcile with the facts of the case General Longstreet's expression, wherein he says that his paper in the *Times* is called out by the fact that he has "been so repeatedly and rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding-General, in that battle, gives an importance to their assaults."

His communications *just after the war* to Mr. Swinton, the historian, were in substance the same attack upon General Lee which he has repeated in this paper. It was, therefore, in him, and came out before any of the utterances now complained of were made. The official reports of Generals Ewell, Early, and Pendleton, written soon after the battle, clearly stated it was well understood and expected that General Longstreet would make the main attack *early* in the morning of the 2nd of July.

If these reports furnished the "sly under-current of misrepresentation" of his course, why did he not ask his chief to correct their statements, and set him right upon the record? His revelations, if accepted now, would greatly injure the military reputations of Generals Lee, Ewell, and Hill. Alas! not one of whom live, for history's sake, to defend their stainless fame.

I propose to show, first, it was General Lee's intention to attack at sunrise or as soon as possible thereafter; second, the probable result of such an attack promptly made at an early hour, and, third, to examine the statement that General Longstreet had a plan to fight the battle different from General Lee's, which plan General Lee has since said would have been successful if adopted.

On the night of July 1st two corps of General Lee's army lay in close proximity to the enemy, ready, willing, and expecting to fight as early as possible on the next morning; and two divisions, McLaws and Hood's, of the three in the remaining corps the same night bivouaced some four miles in rear.

The natural inference to be deduced from their positions would be that the Federal troops hastening up would concentrate and fortify in front of the two corps already in position, while the force in rear would be used to attack at the most vulnerable and available point. That such was General Lee's intention I think can be as clearly established as that General Longstreet did not, upon the 2nd of July, 1863, use due diligence in carrying out the wishes of his chief.

General Early, a division-commander in Ewell's corps, in a recent paper on Gettysburg, gives a detailed narrative of a conference which General Lee held on the evening of the 1st with Ewell, Rodes, and himself, in which General Lee seemed very anxious for an attack to be made as early as possible next morning, and after being persuaded that it would not be best to make the main attack in Ewell's front said, "Well, if I attack from my right, Longstreet will have to make the attack—Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow." General Early further states that General Lee left the conference with the distinct understanding that he would order Longstreet up to make the attack early the next morning.

General W. N. Pendleton, General Lee's chief-of-artillery, testifies that General Lee told him on the night of the 1st, when he reported to him the result of a reconnoissance on the right flank, that he "had ordered General Longstreet to attack on that flank at sunrise next morning."

The official reports of Generals Ewell, Early, and Pendleton, all confirm this testimony. General A. P. Hill, in his official report of the battle of Gettysburg, says, speaking of the operations of the morning of the 2nd, "General Longstreet was to attack the left flank of the enemy and sweep down his line, and I was directed to co-operate with him." General Long, one of the witnesses introduced by General Longstreet, who was at that time General Lee's military secretary, says, (in the portion of his letter which General Longstreet found it convenient to leave out, but which Gen.

Early was fortunately able to supply,) "that it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the 2nd of July as early as practicable, and it is my opinion that he issued orders to that effect." In letters published in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for August and September, 1877, General Long gives various details which demonstrate that General Lee expected Longstreet to attack early in the morning of the 2nd; that, at 10 o'clock, "General Lee's impatience became so urgent that he proceeded in person to hasten the movements of Longstreet; that he was met by the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion; and that, after further annoying delays, at 1 o'clock P. M. General Lee's impatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet." Col. Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff, whose letter General Longstreet gives to show that he did not hear the order for an early attack, says, in his article published in the *Southern Historical Society Papers* for September, 1877, "it is generally conceded that General Longstreet on this occasion was fairly chargeable with tardiness;" that he had been urged the day before by General Lee "to hasten his march;" and, that, on the morning of the 2nd, "General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless and rode back to meet General Longstreet and urge him forward."

General Lindsay Walker, chief-of-artillery of Hill's corps, in a letter to me, says:

Letter from General R. Lindsay Walker.

RICHMOND, VA., *January 17th, 1878.*

General FITZ. LEE:

MY DEAR SIR: I cheerfully comply with a request to give you the following brief statement:

I was, at Gettysburg, as I continued to be to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, chief of artillery of the Third corps, (Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, commanding,) and it was, therefore, necessary for me to know on the evening of the 1st of July what dispositions of my artillery to make for the next day. I have a *strong impression* that I heard General Lee say that evening that he wished the battle opened at the earliest possible moment the next morning by a simultaneous attack on both flanks, and

that this conversation took place with Generals Lee, Longstreet, Hill, and perhaps Ewell.

But I am positive that in receiving my instructions from General Hill, on the night of the 1st of July, he told me that the orders were for the attack on the heights to be made at daybreak the next morning on both flanks—that the Third corps was to co-operate as circumstances might determine—and that the artillery should be held in readiness to support either flank, or to advance in front as should be decided.

We were ready at daybreak the next morning, and waited impatiently for the signal. Between 9 and 10 o'clock, I was lying under the shade of a tree near Colonel W. F. Poague, who commanded that day the reserve artillery of my corps, when General Lee rode up to him and, mistaking him for one of General Longstreet's officers, administered to him a sharp rebuke for being *there* instead of hurrying into position on the right. Colonel Poague explained that he was in Hill's, not Longstreet's command, and General Lee at once apologized and eagerly asked, "Do you know where General Longstreet is?" Colonel Poague referred him to me, and I immediately came forward from my position (where I had heard distinctly the conversation), and offered to ride with General Lee to where I thought he could find General Longstreet. As we rode together General Lee manifested more impatience than I ever saw him show upon any other occasion; seemed very much disappointed and worried that the attack had not opened earlier, and very anxious for Longstreet to attack at the very earliest possible moment. He even, for a little while, placed himself at the head of one of the brigades to hurry the column forward.

I was fully satisfied then, as I am now, that General Lee had decided to attack early on the morning of the 2d; that he was bitterly disappointed at the protracted delay, and that this delay enabled General Meade to concentrate his forces and to occupy key positions, which we could have seized in the morning, and thus lost us a great victory.

I have the honor to be sir,

Very respectfully, your obd't serv't,

R. L. WALKER.

At daylight on the morning of the 2d General Longstreet was at General Lee's headquarters renewing his protest against making an attack, but General Lee "seemed resolved to attack," so says General Longstreet. As General Lee afterwards became so worried at the non-appearance of General Longstreet's troops, is it not a fair presumption that General Longstreet had already received his instructions? General Hood, writing to Longstreet, says, "General Lee was seemingly anxious you should attack that morning, and you said to me, the General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett."

In General Longstreet's official report we find that "Laws' brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day and joined about noon on the 2d. *Previous to his joining* [the italics are mine] I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move with the portion of my command *that was up*, to gain the Emmetsburg road on the enemy's left," * * * and that "fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I DELAYED until General Laws' brigade joined its division." And yet in face of this, his official report, he charges the responsibility of the delay of his attack to General Lee in his recent paper to the *Times*, by writing that after receiving from General Lee the order to attack at 11 o'clock, he waited for Laws' brigade to come up, and that "*General Lee assented.*" The two statements, it will be readily perceived, are at variance.

General Hood says he arrived, with his staff, in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak on the morning of the 2d, and that his troops soon filed into an open field near by. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, Longstreet corps, states that his reserve artillery arrived on the field about the same hour and reported themselves ready to go into battle. The Commanding-General was impatient—why the delay then until 4 P. M. in what General Lee intended to be his main attack?

General Longstreet, in his narrative, contends that the delay of several hours in the march of his column to the right was General Lee's fault, since the column was moved under the special directions of Colonel Johnston, an engineer officer of the Commanding-General, and having for the time the authority of General Lee himself, which he, Longstreet, could not set aside. Although he

finally "became very impatient at this delay and determined to take the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward," which he did by what he seems to regard an ingenious flanking of General Lee's orders, viz., marching Hood, who was in McLaws' rear and not governed by General Lee's dilatory orders, "by the most direct route" to the position assigned him. If the military principle here established by General Longstreet is correct, why would not it have been that much better to have simply left a platoon at the head of his command to go through the form of following General Lee's engineer, and hasten on with the remainder of his command?

But in his official report (which he should have consulted) Longstreet says: "Engineers sent out by the Commanding-General and myself guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move—*some delay* ensued in seeking a more convenient route" (*italics mine*). It contains no hint that he lost "several hours by the blundering" of General Lee's engineer, Colonel S. P. Johnston, the gallant engineer officer mentioned by General Longstreet, tells me that he read the paper in the *Times* "with some surprise, particularly that portion where reference is made to the part I took in the operations of the 2d July," and says that he "had no idea that I (he) had the confidence of the great Lee to such an extent that he would entrust me with the conduct of an army corps moving within two miles of the enemy's line, while the lieutenant-general was riding at the rear of the column." Colonel Johnston, and I state it on his authority, was ordered by General Lee to make a reconnoissance on the enemy's left early on the morning of the 2d. On that errand he left army headquarters about 4 A. M. Upon returning he was required to sketch upon a map General Lee was holding the route he had taken, and was soon ordered to ride with General Longstreet." NO OTHER ORDERS HE RECEIVED. In obedience to such instructions he joined the head of Longstreet's corps about 9 A. M., and it was then about three miles from Round Top, by the route selected for its march. "After no little delay [I quote Colonel Johnston's words] the column got in motion and marched under cover of the ridge and woods until the head of the column got to about one and a half miles of the position finally taken by General Hood's division. Here the road turned to the right and led over a high hill to where

it intersected a road leading back in the direction of the Round Top. When we reached the bend of the road, I called General Longstreet's attention to the hill over which he would have to pass, in full view of the enemy, and also to a route across the field, shorter than the road and completely hidden from the enemy's observation. General Longstreet preferred the road, and followed it until the head of his column reached the top of the hill. He then halted McLaws and ordered Hood forward. At the time our movement was discovered we were not more than a mile and a half from the position finally reached by Hood. Had General McLaws pushed on by the route across the field he] would have been in position in less than an hour; yet General Longstreet says 'several hours' were lost by his taking the 'wrong road. The delay of 'several hours' cannot be attributed to General Longstreet's taking the wrong road (whether he or I is to blame for that), but in the delay in starting, the slowness of the march, 'the time unnecessarily lost by halting McLaws, and the time lost in getting into action after the line was formed. The fact that General Lee ordered me to make the reconnoissance and return as soon as possible, led me to believe, if he intended to attack at all, such attack was to be made at an early hour."

Colonel Johnston did not even know where General Longstreet was going. He supposed he had been ordered to ride with him simply to give him the benefit of his reconnoissance. He must be surprised then, as he states, to find himself considered by Gen. Longstreet in charge of McLaws' division, First corps, Army Northern Virginia. I dwell on this point because it is a most important one. Gettysburg was lost by just this delay of "several hours."

Facts, however, do not warrant us in believing that General Longstreet was always so particular in following officers sent by General Lee to guide his column, because many of us recall that in the opening of the spring campaign of 1864, General Lee sent an engineer officer to General Longstreet, then encamped near Gordonsville, to guide him to the point he wanted him in the wilderness, but this officer was pushed aside by General Longstreet's saying he knew the route and had no use for his services. As a consequence, he lost his way and reached the wilderness twenty-four hours behind time, just as A. P. Hill was about to sustain

a terrible disaster which Longstreet gallantly averted. This incident comes direct from General Lee himself, who cited it as an instance of Longstreet's habitual slowness.

From known facts then, it seems clearly established that to General Longstreet and not to General Lee, as the former claims, must be attributed the delay in the attack of the 2nd.

Let us now enquire what would have been the probable results of an earlier attack. From very accurate data in my possession I am enabled to give the following as the position of the Federal forces on the 2nd of July:

I begin on their right: At 6 A. M. Culp's Hill was only occupied by Wadsworth's division, First corps, and Stevens' Fifth Maine battery, Wadsworth's command being much shattered by the fight of the 1st. On our extreme left opposed to Wadsworth, were three brigades of Johnson's division, Ewell's corps. One of his brigades, Walker's, was in position faced to the left to guard the flank of our army. In front of Walker lay William's division of the Twelfth corps, and two regiments of Lockwood's independent brigade, and the Fifth corps, except Crawford's division, which arrived on the field about twelve o'clock. (Crawford's testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War).

The Eleventh corps occupied Cemetery Hill with the artillery attached to the First and Eleventh corps, except Stevens' battery, before mentioned. Doubleday's division of the First corps was massed in rear of Cemetery Hill, while Robertson's division of the same corps extended to the left along Cemetery Ridge, embracing that portion of it assaulted by Longstreet on the 3rd.

From the left of Robertson the line was occupied for about three quarters of a mile beyond which point two brigades of Humphreys' division of the Third corps were massed, and on their left two brigades of Birney's division of same corps, and constituting all of that corps then up—Birney and Humphreys having each left a brigade at Emmettsburg. General Humphreys, in a private letter to me, says "Birney reached Gettysburg about sunset the first day, leaving one brigade at Emmettsburg—with Birney there were probably 4,500, and at Emmettsburg 1,500. My division (Second division Third corps) reached the ground towards midnight of July 1st, leaving one brigade at Emmettsburg—with me there were about 4,000, and at Emmettsburg about 1,200.

"The return of the Third corps for the 30th of June, 1863, gives officers and enlisted men, infantry, present for duty 11,942; but there were less than 11,000 present at the battle. My impression is that the corps did not exceed 10,000 present on the ground."

These four brigades of the Third corps lay a little west of the crest of the ridge. The crest proper was held by Geary's division of the Twelfth corps from the night before, but about this time they began to move over to Culp's Hill, where they formed on a prolongation of Wadsworth's line, already mentioned. In front of the Third corps was Buford's two brigades of cavalry; and these troops at the time mentioned, 6 A. M., except some batteries of artillery, constituted all the troops *then up*. Mark the point—the Second corps, Hancock's, 12,088, by the return of June 30th, was in bivouac three miles in rear on the night of the 1st, (nearly as far from the Federal as Longstreet was from the Confederate lines). It broke camp at an early hour, and a little after 6 A. M. had reached that portion of the Taneytown road, running along the slope of Little Round Top. Between the hours of 6 and 9 A. M. some important changes were made. Let us commence on the Federal right again. Williams had assumed command of the Twelfth corps, and Ruger had taken his division, and with Lockwood's regiments, had moved over to Culp's Hill and formed on a prolongation of Geary's line. Notice how Meade was increasing the forces opposed to our left—the Fifth corps numbering, on the 10th of June, 1863, 10,136 for duty, to which was added a portion of the Pennsylvania reserves, some 4,000 or 5,000, (Butterfield, then chief of Meade's staff, testimony before Committee on Conduct of the War, page 428,) moved across Rock Creek, was massed and held in reserve, where it lay until called upon to support Sickles in the afternoon, when its place was taken by the Sixth corps, which arrived at 3 P. M., having marched 32 miles since 9 P. M. on the first—(Meade's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, page 438). This was the largest of the seven corps Meade had at Gettysburg, and on the 10th of June, 1863, numbered, for duty, 15,408. (Butterfield, page 428). It will be perceived that when two-thirds of Longstreet's corps went into camp four miles in rear of the field of Gettysburg, on the evening of the first of July, Sedgewick, with over 15,000 men, was 32 miles away. Upon his arrival, about the hour above

named, he was ordered to relieve the Fifth corps. The latter corps was then ordered to move to the rear of Round Top; it reached there and was massed half a mile in rear between 4 and 5 P. M. Caldwell's division of the Second corps occupied Round Top just before the Fifth corps got up. (Meade.) Wadsworth's division and the Eleventh corps continued to occupy its first position until the close of the battle. Doubleday remained in the position before named until night, but Robertson's division was relieved by the Second corps, which had arrived at 7 A. M., and gone into position on Cemetery Ridge. The two remaining brigades of the Third corps left at Emmetsburg got up about 9 A. M., relieving Buford's cavalry, which was ordered back to Westminster to protect the depot of supplies. About the same time General Tyler came up with eight batteries of artillery. At half-past 10 A. M. Major McGilvrey reached the field with the artillery reserve and ammunition train. At this hour the Federal army was all up, except one regiment of Lockwood's brigade, Sixth corps, whose movements have been previously given. At about 11 A. M. General Sickles ordered a reconnoissance, and at 12, advanced his command and occupied the intermediate ridge, extending his line to the foot of Round Top. Round Top was occupied as a signal station; the Fifth, it will be recollected, was, after 4 P. M., massed in its rear.

I ask a careful perusal of the positions, strength, and time of arrival upon the battle-field of the Federal troops on the 2d of July as here given. I think it will show that an attack at day-break or sunrise, or at an hour preceding 9 A. M., nay, even 12 M., would have combined many elements of success. General Lee knew it, and to use Longstreet's own words, "was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals *he could whip them in detail*" (*italics mine*). General Lee, it seems, as was habitual with him, had a correct idea of the situation. His army, except a portion of the cavalry and one division of infantry, was practically concentrated on the night of July 1st, and could have attacked, if necessary, at daylight on the 2d. General Meade arrived, in person, at 1 A. M. on the 2d, and was engaged in getting his army up until after 2 P. M. on that day. He commanded at Gettysburg seven corps of infantry, viz., First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Twelfth, and three divisions of cavalry, viz., Buford's,

Kilpatrick's, and Gregg's—the two last reaching the field after Buford left. The First corps went into battle on the 2d with 2,450 men (Bates' History of Gettysburg, page 52, and Doubleday's testimony—who commanded it after Reynolds' death—page 309, Committee on the Conduct of the War); the Second corps being put at 12,088 (return of June 30th); the Third, including the two brigades not then up, 10,000 (General Humphrey's letter to me); the Fifth at 10,136; the Eleventh at 3,200 (this corps numbered 10,177 on the 10th of June. General Hancock said he could not find but 1,200 organized on the afternoon of the 1st of July, after their little difficulty with Ewell and Hill. Wadsworth's division, of that corps, went into the fight on the 1st with 4,000 men, and on the morning of 2d but 1,600 answered to their names—Wadsworth's testimony, page 413). The Twelfth corps, by the return of the 30th of June, numbered 8,056. These six corps numbered, then, on the 2d of July, before the Sixth corps reached the field, 45,930. The cavalry and 4,000 Pennsylvania reserves are not included in this statement of the Federal force. Ewell and Hill's corps numbered together about 28,000 men on the morning of the 2d, and Longstreet says he had, without Pickett, some 13,000 men, making our strength (leaving out the cavalry, too,) 41,000. General Lee could have had his 41,000 men in hand at daybreak, whereas General Meade could not count upon all of his 45,930 until after 12 M., Crawford's division, Fifth corps, not getting up, until then. General Longstreet, by an early attack, would have undoubtedly seized Round Top, for even as late as the attack was made, General Warren, Meade's chief of artillery (Warren's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, page 377), says he went by General Meade's directions to Round Top, and from that point "I could see the enemy's line of battle. I sent word to General Meade that he would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible a division of General Sykes' corps, (Fifth,) but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle, I should think a mile and a half long, began to advance and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it." An attack at that point even before 12 o'clock would have been successful, because Sykes was then in reserve behind Meade's right and could

not have gotten up. And Meade testifies (page 332) that Sykes, by hurrying up his column, fortunately was enabled to drive the enemy back and secure a foothold upon that important position, viz., Round Top, "the key-point of my whole position," General Meade says. And again, that "if they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground I subsequently held until the last." Behold the sagacity of General Lee! He wanted to attack early so as to "whip the Federals in detail," and selected the very point admitted by his able opponent to be his "key-point." It seems he would have gained the position if he could have imparted more velocity to the commander on his right. General Lee's plan seems, in a military sense, almost faultless. An English writer has said of General Lee, that with a character as near perfect as has been hitherto vouchsafed to mortals, there was yet in it, for a military man, a slight imperfection, viz., "a disposition too *epicene*." To the tender and loving heart of the woman he united the strong courage and will of the man, but a reluctance to oppose the wishes or desires of others, or to order them to do things disagreeable to them which they would not fully consent to or enter into. Perhaps herein lies the secret of his troubles on the 2d of July. He was fully alive, on his part, to the necessity of an early attack, and he saw with an unerring eye the "key-point," but in view of the unwillingness of the commander of the troops he had determined to begin the battle with, and who was at his headquarters at daylight arguing against, instead of making the attack, he may not have put his orders in that positive shape from which there could be no evasion, no appeal. General Hood, in a letter to me, says "I did not hear General Lee give the direct order to Longstreet to attack on the morning of the second day, nor have I ever believed that he gave a positive and direct order to do so, but merely as he (General Lee) often did, suggested the attack." If Hood is correct, the suggestion had the strength of an order in General Lee's own mind at least, because upon no other theory can we explain his personal actions and impatience on that morning or his own words to others. The attempt of General Longstreet to hold General Lee to the full responsibility of the failure at Gettysburg, because, in a spirit of magnanimity which has excited the highest admiration both in this country and in Europe, he said on the

field of Gettysburg, "It is all my fault," as he had said in like spirit to Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, "The victory is yours, not mine," will excite only surprise and not carry conviction to the minds of the old soldiers of General Lee, who knew the General's habit of self-depreciation. The effort must therefore fail in its purpose.

Now let us scrutinize the statement of General Longstreet that he had a plan to fight the battle of Gettysburg, which was submitted to General Lee and refused by him at the time, but which he afterwards regretted not having adopted, as it would have been successful. General Dick Taylor, in recent paper, says: "That any subject involving the possession or exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those possessing knowledge of the two men."

Readers of the history of the four years of "War between the States" will doubtless agree with General Taylor. General Lee's plan of battle at Gettysburg, in the light of subsequent facts, could not have been more admirably arranged if he had possessed, in lieu of his own grand genius, the McCormick telescope, and the centre and both flanks of the Federal army had been within its focus. Why should he then have regretted that he had not adopted the plan of another? About one month after the battle of Gettysburg, General Lee wrote a letter to the President of the Confederacy, in which, after undervaluing his own ability, he says, "Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon your Excellency, from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader—one who could accomplish more than I could perform, and all that I have wished. I hope your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason, the desire to serve my country." To this the Honorable Jefferson Davis, in the course of his reply, responds, "But suppose, my dear friend, that I were to admit, with all their implications, the points which you present, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which you believe to be required? I do not doubt the readiness with which you would give way to one

who could accomplish all that you have wished; and you will do me the justice to believe that if Providence should kindly offer such a person, I would not hesitate to avail myself of his services. To ask me to substitute you by some one, in my judgment, more fit to command or who would possess more of the confidence of the army or of the reflecting men of the country, is to demand an impossibility."

I give extracts from these two letters because, some two years ago, General Lee's whole letter to Mr. Davis was reproduced in some of the public prints. It was followed by General Longstreet's letter to his uncle, (again republished in his paper to the *Times*), and which first gave to the world the information that another plan to fight this great battle had been considered by the Commander of the Confederate army. This news was in turn succeeded by an extract from a letter from General Lee to General Longstreet, wherein he says, "Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg, instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been." Following this came an extract from a letter of Captain Gorie to General Longstreet. The captain had been sent as a bearer of dispatches from General Longstreet, then in East Tennessee, to General Lee at Orange Courthouse. In this extract Captain Gorie tells us that, "upon my arrival there General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone, with two or three Northern papers on his table: He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official reports of the battle of Gettysburg, and that he had become satisfied that, if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the 3rd day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful."

These little extracts which General Longstreet uses again in his narrative, seem to appear as a desirable connection and to ring out a public notice, that the younger and abler man referred to by General Lee was the commander of his First army corps, and as there are witnesses still living to testify that General Longstreet once said in the house of the late John Alexander, at Campbell Courthouse, just after the surrender at Appomattox, that in case of another war he would never fight under General Lee again, it is fair to presume that he, too, was conscious of his own superiority, if all this be true.

Very many of us were not able to reconcile these reported utterances of General Lee with facts within our own knowledge; and General Longstreet was asked more than once to publish the whole letter that he claimed to have received from General Lee, that we might see the connection before and after the short sentence he permitted only to be known. His reply to this was concluded in hasty language foreign to the enquiry, and he failed to produce anything more. In the narrative in the *Times*, once again appears the same sentence, "only that and nothing more." It is possible that, after General Lee's plans had been frustrated and his opportunity lost, he would naturally regret that he had not taken the advice of one who urged him not to attack.

In the Rev. J. Wm. Jones' "Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes, and Letters of Lee," page 156, we find that General Lee, in speaking (to Professor White, of Washington and Lee University,) of the irreparable loss the South had sustained in the death of Jackson, said with emphasis: "If I had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg, we should have won a great victory." How, by General Lee's or General Longstreet's plan? Tell me, you who knew Jackson best, if he had been in command of troops, say four miles in rear of the battle-field on the night of the 1st of July, 1863, and General Lee had suggested to him to attack from his right on the morning of the 2d, what hour would he have attacked Meade's "key-point" on Round Top? Would the hour have approached nearer to 4 A. M. or 4 P. M.? For General Lee has said, "I had such implicit confidence in Jackson's skill and energy that I never troubled myself to give him detailed instructions—the most general instructions were all that he needed." But as bearing upon this point stronger, if possible, than Lee's wish for Jackson at Gettysburg, is the following language in a letter to me from a gentleman extensively known and universally noted for the purity of his life and the conscientiousness of his character, and who now worthily fills the responsible position of Governor of his State. This letter was written some two years ago in response to a note of mine sending him the published controversy between General Longstreet and Early in reference to the operations at Gettysburg. The high character of the writer gives to his statements great weight, but the letter being a private one, would have been kept from the public had not General Longstreet paraded what he

terms "the weak points of the campaign of Gettysburg," in attempting to show the "eight" mistakes committed by General Lee.

The name of the author is not now given, because I do not wish to draw him into the discussion, but it is at the disposal of any one who questions the facts. His letter bears date April 15th, 1876:

Major-General FITZHUGH LEE:

"MY DEAR SIR: I am in receipt to-day of your letter of the 14th inst., with its interesting inclosures in reference to the battle of Gettysburg. I have not had leisure to follow closely the controversy to which the article refers, but I remember perfectly my conversation with General Lee on this subject. He said plainly to me 'that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him and had made the attack early instead of late.' He said further, 'General Longstreet, when once in a fight, was a most brilliant soldier; but he was the hardest man to move I had in my army.'" * * * * *

Does this testimony prove that General Lee regretted that he had not adopted another's plan to fight the battle of Gettysburg, or is it not cumulative to all the other well-known facts? Gen. Pleasanton, Meade's cavalry commander, writes a paper for the *Philadelphia Times*, January 19th, 1878, in which he tells us what he said to Meade after our repulse on the 3rd, and this is it: "I rode up to him, and after congratulating him on the splendid conduct of his army I said, 'General, I will give you half an hour to show yourself a great general. Order the army to advance while I take the cavalry; get in Lee's rear and we will finish the campaign in a week.'" A Sandwich Islander, knowing nothing about the war except what he might read in these papers of Generals Longstreet and Pleasanton, but of a humane and benevolent disposition, would inwardly rejoice that *they* did not command their respective armies lest the historic feat of the "Kilkenny Cats" should have been eclipsed by not even leaving to the public their two tales.

In conclusion, let our fancy picture the grim veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia paraded in their camp-grounds in that month of August, 1863, to hear the announcement that Mr. Davis had accepted the resignation of their chief, would there not have resounded from front to rear, from flank to flank, "*Le Roi est*

mort"? but when the "younger and abler man," whoever he might be, assumed command, the mummies of the Pyramids or the skeleton bones beneath the ruins of Pompeii could not be more silent than the refusal of these heroes to sing to Lee's successor, "*Vive Le Roi*."

Aye, as certain as that the day will roll around, when "the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed," so sure would the Angel of Peace have donned her white and shining robes in that hour that General Lee bid farewell to the Army of Northern Virginia and mounted "Traveller" to ride away from his people. The termination of the war would indeed have simplified the duties of "the younger and abler man!"

Official Report of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, A. N. V.

[The following report has never been published, and so far as we know the original MS. from which we print is the only copy in existence. We are indebted to its distinguished author for the privilege of adding it to our Gettysburg series.]

HEADQUARTERS ARTILLERY CORPS, A. N. V.,
September 12th, 1862.

GENERAL: A report of artillery operations during the late campaign I have now the honor to submit. It has been somewhat retarded by delays on the part of battalion commanders.

The severe contests near Fredericksburg, early in May, having resulted disastrously to the enemy, opportunity was allowed us of repairing losses and getting ready for subsequent operations. To this end my energies were directed throughout the month of May. What had been the general reserve was distributed, and the three corps into which the army was now divided had assigned to each five artillery battalions, averaging four four-gun batteries, each battalion being satisfactorily equipped and well commanded, and the group for each corps being under charge of a suitable chief.

On the 5th of June, when preparations were in progress for a removal of general headquarters on the new campaign, the First and Second corps having already marched toward Culpeper, the enemy appeared in some force opposite Fredericksburg, and in the afternoon opened a heavy artillery fire near the mouth of Deep Run, under cover of which they established, as some months before, a pontoon bridge and pushed across a body of infantry. That evening and the following morning were employed in adjusting the artillery and other troops of the Third corps, left on the Fredericksburg heights for this very contingency. But indications being satisfactory that the movement was only a feint, the Commanding-General, soon after midday, moved forward. According to instructions, my own course was also directed towards Culpeper, where, after a bivouac for the night, we arrived early on Sunday morning, June 7th. On the afternoon of June 13th the Second corps, Lieutenant-General Ewell commanding, which had a day or two before marched from Culpeper, approached Win-

chester, and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews' artillery battalion operated with effect in driving back the enemy's advance on the Front Royal road.

In the attack upon the enemy's fortifications next day, resulting in his hasty retreat and the capture of his guns and stores, most valuable service was rendered by the artillery under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, and the general charge of the acting chief of artillery for the corps, Colonel J. T. Brown. The works and their armament were alike formidable, and that they were thus rendered untenable by the enemy evinces at once the skill with which our batteries were disposed and the resolution with which they were served. The death of Captain Thompson, of the "Louisiana Guard Artillery," a most gallant and esteemed officer, was part of the price of this victory.

Retreating towards Charlestown, the enemy, near Jordan's Springs, on the morning of the 15th, encountered, with Johnson's division which had marched to intercept him, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews' artillery battalion. The sharp action ensuing, which resulted in the rout of the enemy and capture of most of his men, was especially remarkable for the unexampled steadiness with which artillery fought infantry skirmishers at close quarters. Lieutenant Contee, who commanded a section in a contest of this kind, distinguished himself by cool and persistent daring; and several non-commissioned officers are mentioned by their commanders as evincing like gallantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Contee were in this affair painfully, though not very dangerously wounded.

While these events were transpiring at and near Winchester, General Rodes' division, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Carter's artillery battalion, having marched by Berryville, approached Martinsburg, where was an additional force of the enemy. Under the well-directed fire of Colonel Carter's batteries that force speedily abandoned the town, leaving, in addition to twenty-three captured in Winchester, five superior field-guns. In these several engagements our batteries lost *six* men killed and *fifteen* wounded.

The Second corps, in its subsequent advance across the Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania, was attended by its five battalions: Lieutenant-Colonel Carter's, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews', Lieutenant-Colonel Jones', Colonel Brown's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson's—the three former marching with Rodes', Johnson's, and Early's divisions, the two latter constituting a corps reserve.

Simultaneously with these movements of the Second corps, the First and Third were put in motion, each accompanied by its own artillery force. The First corps, Lieutenant-General Longstreet commanding, left Culpeper June 15th, attended by Major Henry's, Colonel Cabell's, Major Dearing's, Colonel Alexander's, and Major Eshleman's artillery battalions—the three former marching with Hood's, McLaws', and Pickett's divisions, and the two latter constituting a corps reserve. As the route of this corps lay along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, to guard the several passes of that barrier against incursions of the enemy, its artillery was subjected to serious trial from roads frequently difficult and generally rough, and marches, under extreme heat, more than usually long. Additional labor was also imposed on some of the battalions by the necessity of meeting certain demonstrations of the enemy. Actual contest, beyond cavalry skirmishing, he declined.

The Third corps, on the 15th June, left Fredericksburg *en route* for Culpeper and the Shenandoah Valley, *via* Front Royal, accompanied by its artillery battalions, viz.: Lieut.-Colonel Garnett's, Major Poague's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Cutt's, attending the divisions of Generals Heth, Fender, and Anderson, and Majors McIntosh's and Pegram's battalions as a corps reserve.

In this advance, general headquarters being with the First corps, my own were thereby also chiefly regulated. On June 16th, after a week at Culpeper of such artillery preparation and supervision as were requisite and practicable,

I marched towards the Valley, attending near the Commanding-General to be ready for such service as might be required.

On the 25th, the army having sufficiently rested in camp near Millwood and Berryville, crossed the Potomac, the Third corps at Shepherdstown, the First at Williamsport—the Commanding-General being with the latter, and my duties lying near him.

On Wednesday, 1st July, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, having been reached by easy marches, and passed after a rest of one or two days, and the army being in motion towards Gettysburg, occasional cannon shots in that direction were heard by myself and others with the main body, as, before noon, we crossed the mountain. Two divisions of the Third corps, Heth's and Pender's, the former with Pegram's artillery battalion, the latter with McIntosh's, were in advance on this road; while of the Second corps, Early's division, attended by Jones' artillery battalion was approaching from the direction of York, and Rodes' from that of Carlisle, accompanied by Carter's battalion. The advance of the Third corps had encountered, at Gettysburg, a force of the enemy, and the firing heard was the beginning of the battle. Its significance, however, was not then fully understood. It might be only a passing skirmish; it might be more serious.

After a brief pause near Cash Town, to see how it would prove, the Commanding-General finding the cannonade to continue and increase, moved rapidly forward. I did the same, and at his request rode near him for instructions. Arriving near the crest of an eminence more than a mile west of the town, dismounting and leaving horses under cover, we, on foot, took position overlooking the field. It was, perhaps, two o'clock, and the battle was raging with considerable violence. The troops of the Second corps having reached the field sometime after the engagement was opened by those of the Third, Carter's and Jones' batteries were, at the time of our arrival, plied on the left with freshness and vigor upon the batteries and infantry that had been pressing the Third corps; and when these turned upon their new assailants they were handsomely enfiladed by the batteries of McIntosh and Pegram, posted in front of our look-out on the left and right of the road. To counteract this damaging double-attack, the enemy made, especially with his artillery, such effort as he could. Observing the course of events, the Commanding-General suggested whether positions on the right could not be found to enfilade the valley between our position and the town and the enemy's batteries next the town. My services were immediately tendered, and the endeavor was made. Where the Fairfield road crosses our range of hills was the farthest to the right admissible, as there was no infantry support near, and a wooded height a few hundred yards beyond seemed occupied by the enemy. Here some guns that had been sent for from McIntosh's battery were posted, under command of Captain M. Johnson; but to advance them and open fire was not deemed proper till some infantry should arrive, need of which had been promptly reported. Under fire they were, more or less, from the first.

Meanwhile, the enemy yielded ground on the left, our batteries as well as infantry were advanced, and additional troops came up. Garnett's battalion moved to the front, slightly participated in the fight, and then, under cover of a hill near the Brick seminary, awaited orders. Poague's battalion also arrived, and moved to Garnett's right into line under cover, across the Fairfield road, between Captain Johnson's position and the town. Having sent members of my staff to reconnoitre the woods on the right, and explore, as well as they might be able, a road observed along a ravine back of those woods, I now pushed forward on the Fairfield road to the ridge adjoining the town, intending to put there Garnett's and other guns, which had been previously ordered forward. The position was within range of the hill beyond the town to which the enemy was retreating, and where he was massing his batteries. General Ramseur, coming up from the town which his command had just occupied, met me at this point and requested that our batteries might not then

open, as they would draw a concentrated fire upon his men, much exposed. Unless as part of a combined assault, it would be worse than useless, I at once saw, to open fire there. Captain Maurin, of Garnett's battalion, in command of several batteries, was therefore directed to post his guns and be ready, but to keep his horses under cover, and not to fire till further orders. Having further examined this ridge, and communicated with Colonel Walker, chief of artillery, Third corps, I returned across the battle-field and sent to inform the Commanding-General of the state of facts, especially of the road to the right, believed to be important towards a flank movement against the enemy in his new position. While these operations occurred, Andrews' battalion and the two reserve battalions, Second corps, came up with Johnson's division, on the Cash Town road, and proceeded to join the other troops of their corps on the left; and Colonel Brown, acting chief of artillery for that corps, sent to find, if practicable, an artillery route towards a wooded height commanding the enemy's right. No farther attack, however, was made, and night closed upon the scene.

Early on the morning of the 2d the enemy, being now strongly posted on the heights to which he had retired the previous evening, the artillery of the Second corps occupied positions from the Seminary hill round to the left, the gallant Major Latimer, commanding Andrews' battalion, being on the extreme left, and Colonel Brown's battalion, under Captain Dance, on the right, near the Seminary. Further to the right, on Seminary Ridge, Colonel Walker posted the artillery of the Third corps, except Poague's battalion and a portion of Garnett's, held for a season in reserve. From the farthest occupied point on the right and front, in company with Colonels Long and Walker, and Captain Johnson (engineer), I soon after sunrise surveyed the enemy's position towards some estimate of the ground, and the best mode of attack. So far as from such a view judgment could be formed, assault on the enemy's left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle. To attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the Commanding-General. Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening, and was made aware of having entered the enemy's lines by meeting two armed, dismounted cavalrymen. Apparently surprised, they immediately surrendered, and were disarmed and sent to the rear, with two of the three members of my staff present.

Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road, which furnished a very extensive view, and dispatched messengers to General Longstreet and the Commanding-General. Between this point and the Emmetsburg road the enemy's cavalry were seen in considerable force, and moving up along the road towards the enemy's main position, bodies of infantry and artillery, accompanied by their trains.

This front was, after some time, examined by Colonel Smith and Captain Johnson, engineers, and about midday General Longstreet arrived and viewed the ground. He desired Colonel Alexander to obtain the best view he then could of the front. I therefore conducted the Colonel to the advanced point of observation previously visited. Its approach was now more hazardous from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, so that special caution was necessary in making the desired observation.

Just then a sharp contest occurred in the woods to the right and rear of this forward point. Anderson's division, Third corps, had moved up, and was driving the enemy from those woods. Poague's artillery battalion was soon after sent to co-operate with that division, and also a battery from Lane's battalion.

These woods having been thus cleared of the enemy, some view of the ground beyond them, and much farther to the right than had yet been exam-

ined, seemed practicable. I therefore rode in that direction, and when about to enter the woods, met the Commanding-General *en route* himself for a survey of the ground. There being here still a good deal of sharp-shooting, the front had to be examined with caution. General Wilcox, commanding on the right of Anderson's division, had already seen beyond the farther edge of the woods, and under his guidance I accompanied Colonel Long to the farmhouse, at the summit where the cross-road from Fairfield, &c., emerges. Having noticed the field, and the enemy's batteries, &c., I returned to General Longstreet for the purpose of conducting his column to this point, and supervising, as might be necessary, the disposition of his artillery. He was advancing by ravine-road, as most out of view, time having been already lost in attempting another, which proved objectionable because exposed to observation.

On learning the state of facts ahead, the General halted and sent back to hasten his artillery. Members of my staff were also dispatched to remedy, as far as practicable, the delay. Cabell's, Alexander's, and Henry's battalions at length arrived, and the whole column moved towards the enemy's left. Colonel Alexander, by General Longstreet's direction, proceeded to explore the ground still farther to the right, and Henry's battalion, accompanying Hood's division, was thrown in that direction. Upon these, as soon as observed, the enemy opened a furious cannonade, the course of which rendered necessary a change in the main artillery column. Cabell's battalion deflected to the right, while Alexander's was mainly parked for a season, somewhat under cover, till it could advance to better purpose. The fire on the cross-road through the woods having, after some time, slackened, I reconnoitered that front again. As before, the enemy was only a few hundred yards off, awaiting attack.

Soon after, at about 4 P. M., the general assault was made. Alexander's battalion moved into position, fronting the peach orchard near the Emmetsburg road, and opened with vigor, as did the battalion to its right. The enemy obstinately resisted and our batteries suffered severely. Within an hour, however, his guns were silenced and his position carried. Alexander then ran forward his pieces, which did effectual service in hastening and confining the enemy to his rear position on the mountain. Between his guns in that position and our batteries, a cannonade was kept up more or less briskly until dark.

While the First corps thus advanced into position and operated on the right, the batteries of the Third corps, from the advanced position in the centre, early taken, occupied the attention of the enemy by a deliberate fire during the whole afternoon. Opportunity was once or twice taken by myself to observe the progress and effect of this fire. It elicited a spirited reply, and was useful in preventing full concentration by the enemy on either flank.

On the left attack was also delayed till the afternoon. About 4 P. M. the guns of the Second corps in position on that front generally opened with a well-directed and effective fire. This also, although the right seemed to claim my chief attention, was partially observed by me from the central ridge in rear of the Third corps. Massed as were the enemy's batteries on the Cemetery Hill fronting our left, and commanding as was their position, our artillery admirably served, as it was there operated under serious disadvantage and with considerable loss. It still, however, for the most part maintained its ground and prepared the way for infantry operations. Here the gallant Major Latimer, so young and yet so exemplary, received the wound which eventuated in his death. Thus stood affairs at nightfall the 2d: on the left and in the centre, nothing gained; on the right, batteries and lines well advanced—the enemy meanwhile strengthening himself in a position naturally formidable and everywhere difficult of approach.

By direction of the Commanding-General the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening, as early as possible on the morning of the 3d,

a concentrated and destructive fire; consequent upon which a general advance was to be made. The right especially was, if practicable, to sweep the enemy from his stronghold on that flank. Visiting the lines at a very early hour towards securing readiness for this great attempt, I found much, by Colonel Alexander's energy, already accomplished on the right. Henry's battalion held about its original position on the flank, Alexander's was next in front of the peach orchard, then came the Washington artillery battalion, under Major Eshelman, and Dearing's battalion on his left, (these two having arrived since dusk of the day before,) and beyond Dearing, Cabell's battalion had been arranged, making nearly sixty guns for that wing, all well advanced in a sweeping curve of about a mile. In the posting of these there appeared little room for improvement, so judiciously had they been adjusted. To Colonel Alexander, placed here in charge by General Longstreet, the wishes of the Commanding-General were repeated. The battalion and battery commanders were also cautioned how to fire so as to waste as little ammunition as possible. To the Third corps artillery attention was also given. Major Poague's battalion had been advanced to the line of the right wing and was not far from its left; his guns were also well posted; proper directions were also given to him and his officers. The other battalions of this corps, a portion of Garnett's under Major Richardson, being in reserve, held their positions of the day before, as did those of the Second corps; each group having from its chief specific instructions. Care was also given to the convenient posting of ordnance trains, especially for the right, as most distant from the main depot, and due notice given of their position.

From some cause the expected attack was delayed several hours. Meanwhile, the enemy threw against our extreme right a considerable force, which was met with energy, Henry's battalion rendering in its repulse efficient service.

At length, about 1 P. M., on the concerted signal, our guns in position, nearly one hundred and fifty, opened fire along the entire line, from right to left—salvos by battery being much practiced, as directed, to secure greater deliberation and power. The enemy replied with their full force. So mighty an artillery contest has, perhaps, never been waged, estimating together the number and character of guns, and the duration of the conflict. The average distance between contestants was about 1,400 yards, and the effect was necessarily serious on both sides. With the enemy there was advantage of elevation and protection from earth works; but his fire was unavoidably more or less divergent, while ours was convergent. His troops were massed; ours diffused. We, therefore, suffered apparently much less. Great commotion was produced in his ranks, and his batteries were to such extent driven off or silenced as to have ensured his defeat but for the extraordinary strength of his position.

Proceeding again to the right, to see about the anticipated advance of the artillery, delayed beyond expectation, I found, among other difficulties, many batteries getting out of or low in ammunition, and the all-important question of supply received my earnest attention. Frequent shells endangering the First corps ordnance train in the convenient locality I had assigned it, it had been removed farther back. This necessitated longer time for refilling caissons. What was worse, the train itself was very limited, so that its stock was soon exhausted, rendering requisite demand upon the reserve train farther off. The whole amount was thus being rapidly reduced. Our means to keep up supply at the rate required for such a conflict proved practically impossible. There had to be, therefore, some relaxation of the protracted fire, and some lack of support for the deferred and attempted advance. But if this and other causes prevented our sweeping the enemy from his position, he was so crippled as to be incapable of any formidable movement. Night closed upon our guns in their advanced position, and had our resources allowed ammunition for the artillery to play another day, the tremendous part it had performed on this, his stronghold could scarcely have sufficed to save the enemy from rout and ruin.

In the defensive measures directed for the 4th, my care was given to the whole line. The batteries on the right and left were drawn back and kept ready for emergencies. Two batteries of Garnett's battalion, Third corps; two of Eshleman's, First corps; and one of Jones', Second corps, were detailed to report to General Imboden at Cash Town, and aid in guarding the main wagon train back to Williamsport. The battalions generally remained in position most of the day. Nothing, however, was attempted by the enemy. That night artillery and infantry all moved to the rear.

After some casualties, incident in part to the progress of such a train through mountains in an enemy's country infested by cavalry detachments, the batteries accompanying General Imboden arrived with the train at Williamsport late on the 5th, and on the 6th did excellent service in repelling an attack of the enemy.

On the 7th the artillery, with the body of the army, encamped near Hagerstown, without material incident since leaving Gettysburg. Men and animals were, however, much fatigued, and the latter greatly worn down by the hard service they had endured with light fare, and by heavy draught in roads rendered deep by continued rain, with numbers reduced by losses in battle.

On the 10th, attack being threatened by the enemy, the artillery, partaking the hopeful expectations of the whole army, earnestly participated in forming an extended and fortified line of battle, whose left rested on heights west of Hagerstown, and right on the Potomac, some miles below Williamsport.

In full expectation of a decisive battle here, the army was by the Commanding-General called upon for its utmost efforts, and I was specially directed to see that everything possible was accomplished by the artillery. Accordingly for three days, during which the enemy was waited for, my best energies were given, with those of others, to the work of arrangement and preparation. The enemy, however, prudently forebore, and it being undesirable to await him longer, our army was on the night of the 13th withdrawn to the south bank of the Potomac.

In this movement, necessarily involving much labor, greatly increased difficulty was imposed upon those responsible for artillery operations by the enfeebled condition of horses, drawing through roads saturated with rain, and by the swollen state of the river, which confined the whole army, train and all, to one route across the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Still, the task was cheerfully undertaken, and in the main successfully accomplished. With the exception of a few caissons, abandoned by some officers because teams could draw them no longer, and two guns left by those in charge for like reason, the battalions were entirely across by noon of the 14th. After crossing, Carter's guns were placed in position on the hills just below the bridge, some of Garnett's on that just above. Lane's 20-pound Parrotts were also posted some distance further down, and Hurt's Whitworths higher up—all to repel an expected advance of the enemy. A few only of his guns, however, approached, and threw a shell or two, though they took care to keep out of view. A small body of skirmishers, besides, ventured rather nearer, but they were speedily dispersed by some well-directed shots, and cannon were then needed no longer.

In the Pennsylvania expedition our artillery lost: In the First corps—2 officers killed and 9 wounded; 45 men killed, 215 wounded, and 42 missing. Second corps—2 officers killed and 8 wounded; 28 men killed, 94 wounded, and 5 missing. Third corps—1 officer killed, 9 wounded, and 2 missing; 16 men killed, 102 wounded, and 28 missing—total, 5 officers killed, 26 wounded, and 2 missing; 89 men killed, 411 wounded, and 75 missing. Aggregate—608.

Of the officers lost, Captain Fraser, Cabell's battalion, First corps, claims the tribute of grateful honor. No soldier of more unflinching nerve and efficient energy has served the Confederacy in its struggle for existence. He fell severely wounded at Gettysburg, and has since yielded his life for his country. Besides the two serviceable guns mentioned as lost from failure of

teams near the Potomac, the enemy got three of our disabled pieces, of which two were left on the field as worthless, and one sent to the rear, was captured by his cavalry, with a few wagons from the train.

We wrested from him on the battle-field at Gettysburg, three 10-pound Parrott's, one 3-inch rifle, and three Napoleon's, all ready for use against himself.

In the operations thus imperfectly reported, officers and men, almost without exception, evinced in high degree the important virtues of courage, fortitude, and patience; shrinking from no danger at the call of duty, they accepted with equal fidelity the hardships incident to just forbearance and stern service in an enemy's country; alternately heat and protracted storm aggravated other trials. The arid hills of Gettysburg afford no springs, and wells are there speedily exhausted; many, therefore, were the sufferers from thirst in this long mid-summer conflict. Subsequently on the march scarcely less was endurance taxed by pouring rain day and night; yet all this and whatever else occurred, was borne with ready acquiescence and steady resolution. When great merit is so prevalent, individual instances can scarcely be distinguished without danger of injustice to others; certain cases of special heroism are however mentioned by several commanders, whose reports present the facts. On all such details and all the minutiae of operations, more exact information is contained in the several reports of the corps chiefs of artillery and battalion commanders, herewith submitted, than can be presented in a general statement.

Regretting that no more could be achieved in the campaign, yet grateful for what has been accomplished, and for the still increasing strength with which we are enabled to wield this great arm of defence,

I have the honor to be General,

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. N. PENDLETON,

Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.

General R. E. LEE, Commanding.

Letter from General E. P. Alexander.

MONTGOMERY, ALA., February 23, 1878.

Rev. J. WM. JONES, *Secretary:*

DEAR SIR: The letter of Colonel J. B. Walton, in the February No. of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, compels me, very reluctantly, to intrude upon your readers with a brief personal explanation. It might not be necessary were your readers confined to those who have any personal knowledge of the subject, but I trust that even these will excuse me when they remember that your pages have a very wide circulation, and will be referred to for many years to come. I cannot, therefore, consent to be represented in them as having falsely claimed for myself a position which I did not occupy—to wit: that of having commanded in the action at Gettysburg all of the artillery of Longstreet's corps on the field. But I will endeavor to be as brief and as courteous as possible. The facts, which are notorious to every surviving officer and private of every battery concerned in them, are as follows:

I arrived with my battalion, not at the head of the column, but at the very tail of it, having marched in that honorable but unappreciated position from Culpeper to Gettysburg without once having the usual privilege of alternating in the lead on the march. Soon after our arrival Colonel Walton himself brought me an order to report in person to General Longstreet. On doing so,

I was ordered to take command of all the artillery on the field for action, but to leave Colonel Walton's own battalion where it was then in bivouac near the Cashtown road. I did take the command and exercised it actively, and personally put in position every battalion, and nearly every battery, except a part of Henry's battalion, on our extreme right flank, which the pressure in the centre did not allow me time to visit. I did not see or hear from Colonel Walton again that day. During the night his own battalion, under Major Eshleman, reported to me, and I myself placed it in position before daylight, and after daylight corrected its position and posted every other battalion in the corps, and some batteries lent me from the Third corps. Throughout that day I was in the most entire and active command of the whole line of guns, and only withdrew with the last battery late at night, and I have remained in ignorance until this day that my personal supervision was not exclusive. Again, on the 4th, I was sent for by General Longstreet at daylight, and put in charge of a few batteries which, with the infantry, were held to cover the retreat of the rest. Permit me to add brief extracts from a few, out of many letters in my possession, from the best living witnesses, that my statements may not rest on my own word alone. Colonel H. C. Cabell writes to me: * * "You rode up and said you were assigned to the command of the artillery for the fight. Halting my battalion, we rode together to the front, where you showed me the positions you had selected for my guns. * * In short, you were generally recognized as exercising a general command for the fight by me, and the other commands I was in contact with. * * Similar authority was frequently conferred on you—for instance, at Ashby's Gap, Downesville, and notably at Chancellorsville." Colonel W. M. Owens, then Colonel Walton's own adjutant, writes me that late on the night of July 2d, he "found wagon and Colonel Walton on Cashtown road; slept until dawn; firing heard on right; saddled and rode to front. Firing was from left of peach orchard by Washington artillery, under Eshleman, put there by you during the night."

Major B. F. Eshleman writes me, "You placed my battalion in position just to left of peach orchard before dawn of day, and at dawn corrected my position to prevent an enfilade fire from the enemy. * * During the engagement I remember your visiting my command to find how ammunition was holding out." Colonel John C. Haskell, then major of Henry's battalion, writes me, * * "I received an order from you to bring some batteries from the right to the peach orchard and to report to you. You were in command of the line as far as I knew anything about it and Walton was never on the line to my knowledge. You gave me orders to advance on Pickett's right and I heard you give orders to Major Dearing to advance on his left. In short it was notorious that you were in command." Captain R. M. Stribling, of Dearing's battalion, writes, "I saw you frequently on the lines, as I supposed, commanding all the artillery. In frequent conversation afterwards with other artillery officers, it was always assumed as a known fact that you were in command. You in person gave me instructions where to direct my fire. I never saw Colonel Walton during the day." Captain H. H. Carlton, whose battery was one of the nearest to Cemetery Hill, writes me, "My battery was put in position by yourself in front of Cemetery Hill about three or four o'clock on the morning of the 3d. I remember distinctly seeing you often during the day. * * I am confident the whole line of artillery considered itself altogether and entirely under your command. * * You advanced my battery after Pickett's charge and were present and gave all the orders about advancing and firing in person."

These writers represent every battalion on the field except my own—from which it is unnecessary to quote. I omit also corroborating letters from staff officers of General Lee and General Longstreet, and conclude with the following conclusive statement addressed to me the 5th instant by General W. N. Pendleton, then chief of artillery of the army:

"That up to the time of the battle of Gettysburg, Colonel Walton was duly sanctioned chief of artillery of the First corps, he may rightly claim, and that there was no formal order issued displacing him from that position and substituting yourself. But you at the same time are fully justified in affirming that, with care not to mortify Colonel Walton, you were actually put in charge of the artillery of the First corps on the field—as a younger and more active man and a trained officer. The direction was given by General Longstreet, but it had my ready sanction."

The letter of General Longstreet of November 6th, which Colonel Walton prints, only conflicts with the above in saying that I arrived at the head of the column, and in implying that Colonel Walton was absent—on both of these points I am sure that Colonel Walton himself will admit that General Longstreet is mistaken.

General Longstreet also states that he considered me an engineer officer, but as he gave me an artillery command, I trust I am excusable in having spoken of it as such. It is proper to say, in closing, that nearly every letter from which I have quoted expresses personal respect and kind feeling toward Colonel Walton, with much surprise and regret that he should have forced this unpleasant issue and statement of facts; and none can entertain the feelings more deeply and keenly than I do, and I have no desire to say any more than seems essential to establish the truth of my statement and relieve me from the imputation of having unjustly claimed credit due to a comrade.

Respectfully yours,

E. P. ALEXANDER.

**Remarks on the Numerical Strength of Both Armies at Gettysburg by
Comte de Paris.**

[We publish with great pleasure the following paper from our distinguished friend, and only regret that a clear, conclusive note from Colonel Walter H. Taylor, pointing out the errors which the Count still holds (in spite of the fair spirit in which he writes), is crowded into our next number.]

The returns of both armies generally gave three figures for each body of troops, which figures it is essential not to mistake the one with the other for the same army, nor to compare the one with a different one in the opposite armies. These figures showed the number of officers and soldiers: 1st, on the rolls; 2d, present; 3d, present for duty. The first category contained every man belonging to the regiment, either present or absent on leave, sick or healthy, or without leave. It happened in both armies, at certain times, that the absentees numbered more than one-third of the whole force. The second category contained both the officers and men present for duty, and those detached on special duty, under arrest, and in the regimental ambulances or corps hospitals. The proportion between these different classes after a fortnight's active campaign is well illustrated by General Early's divisional return for the 20th June, which is as follows:

Present for duty (3d category), 5,638; percentage, 87. On detached service, 468; percentage, 7.3. Under arrest, 22; percentage, 0.3. Sick list, 343; percentage, 5.4. Total, 6,471; percentage 100.

The total is the figure which is generally given in both armies where only one is given, the number of the men on detached service being liable to vary greatly from day to day.

Confederate Army.—According to the return of the 31st of May, the effective strength of the Army of Northern Virginia was:

Present: Infantry, 54,356; cavalry, 9,536; artillery, 4,460. Total present, 68,852.

If the percentage of the men on detached service, under arrest, and on the sick list was the same for the whole army as for Early's division, and if the army had neither been increased nor diminished, we should find the figure representing the men present for duty at the time each corps reached the banks of the Potomac by a deduction of 13 per cent., which would give us for the three arms 59,901 men.

I do not believe that those two figures (68,852 and 59,901) represent fully the whole strength of the Army of Northern Virginia when it invaded Maryland. Through the operation of the draft the effective strength of each regiment had been increased after Chancellorsville. The regiments had received some recruits between the 15th and the 31st of May; some more came between the 1st and 10th of June. Von Borecke says that the regiments of cavalry were largely increased in that way, but I am not satisfied by such vague statements, and in order to prove the fact, I propose to calculate the average strength of the regiments from the known strength of several corps, divisions, or brigades a few days before the battle, as stated by reliable authorities, and mostly by official reports. I have picked out the following figures from the statement of Confederate officers:

Four regiments: Present, 1,420; average per regiment, 372; present for duty, —; average per regiment, —. Benning's brigade.

Eighteen regiments: Present, 6,471; average per regiment, 360; present for duty, 5,638; average per regiment, 313. Early's division, with one battery of artillery.

Seventeen regiments: Present, 7,000; average per regiment, 412; present for duty, —; average per regiment, —. Heth's division.

Fifteen regiments: Present, —; average per regiment, —; present for duty, 4,484; average per regiment, 299. Pickett's division.

Fifty-three regiments: Present, —; average per regiment, —; present for duty, 17,500; average per regiment, 330. First corps.

It will be seen that the average of the men present for duty in Early's division is exactly the average between the two other figures (299 and 330); we can take it, therefore, as the real standard of the regimental strength, while we shall take, also, Early's figures as being the lowest average for the whole of the men present per regiment.

According to the tabular return of losses of the Army of Northern Virginia in the campaign north of the Potomac, furnished to me by the archives of the United States War Department, this army contained 167 regiments of infantry, and not 163, as Dr. Bates has alleged; and 167 multiplied by 360 and 313 would give us respectively 60,120 infantry men present, and 52,271 present for duty. These 167 regiments of infantry represent the force with which Lee invaded Pennsylvania after he had left Corse's brigade at Hanover Junction, one regiment at Winchester, and had sent two regiments back to Staunton with the prisoners from the latter place. The addition of Pettigrew's brigade, and especially the increase by the draft, must consequently have raised the force of Lee's infantry north of the Potomac by about 6,000 men above the return of the 31st of May. Since that date Stuart's command of cavalry had been increased by Jenkins' brigade of five regiments. Moreover, Imboden's command, which contained three regiments of cavalry and at least a few hundred infantry not accounted for in the above 167 regiments, and was stationed in the Alleghenies somewhat about Romney, I think, joined Lee across the Potomac. Before these additions Stuart's cavalry numbered twenty-five regiments, and had on the 31st of May 9,536 men present, which gives an average of 381 men per regiment. This standard would give 1,905 horsemen to Jenkins, and 1,143 to Imboden, and in the whole 12,584 present, or at the same rates as the infantry, 10,978 present for duty. But, of course, from both figures should be deducted the severe loss of the cavalry at Fleetwood hill and Upperville, which, being about 1,100, reduces the strength of the cavalry when it crossed the Potomac to about 11,484 present, and 9,878 present for duty. The cavalry not being able to take in its rapid marches any one on the sick list, I shall from the first of the last two figures deduct again 5.4 per cent. on that head, which brings down to 10,864 the number of cavalymen who crossed the Potomac. If we reckon Imboden's infantry at only 300 present for duty, we get accordingly the following figures, which, for the cavalymen present for duty, are rather low, as the men detached for duty were less numerous than in the infantry:

Infantry present, 60,459; present for duty, 52,571. Artillery present, 4,460; present for duty, 4,190. Cavalry present, 10,864; present for duty, 9,878. Total present, 75,783; present for duty, 66,639.

As the artillery had no men on detached duty as teamsters, guards, &c., I have deducted, instead of 13 per cent., only 6 per cent. for men on the sick list or under arrest; 4,090 seems already a very low figure if it embraces all the men on duty with the trains of ammunition, which is a military duty, as it gives only men per gun. If all these troops were not at Gettysburg during the whole battle, every man out of them was at a certain time within reach of the field of battle, and therefore under the hand of General Lee. According to General Pendleton's official report, the artillery was divided in 15 battalions, 5 to each corps: each battalion contained 4 batteries of 4 guns each, which give 16 guns per battalion, 80 per corps, and 240 for the whole, to which should be added the horse artillery, containing 6 batteries of 4 guns each or 24 guns, and one brigade battery of 4 guns in Early's division, or 268 guns in the whole. I reckon, therefore, the whole strength of the Army of North-

ern Virginia, in Pennsylvania, at about 76,000 present, out of which at least 66,600 were present for duty, and 268 guns.

Federal Army.—The effective strength of the Army of the Potomac, viz: The number of the men reported as present at the time of the battle, is partly given by Gen. Butterfield, in the testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, the remainder calculated from the average per regiment, and agrees in its total with figures given by General Meade to the same Committee or mentioned in his dispatches. Whenever Federal officers gave what they called their effective strength, the figures represented always all the men present and not only those present for duty. To find the number of these we cannot deduct less than the same 18 per cent. as for the Confederate army. I know positively that the difference was generally larger, sometimes as much as 18 per cent., for if in the Union army the teamsters were not enlisted men, the number of guards, hospital men, escorts of trains, &c., was much larger than in the Southern ranks. Here are the figures derived from Meade's, Butterfield's, and some other statements:

Infantry and divisions artillery present, 87,500; present for duty (13 per cent. less), 76,125. Cavalry present, 12,000; present for duty, 10,440. Reserve artillery, headquarters' escort, signal corps, &c. present, 5,500; present for duty, 4,785. Total present, 105,000; present for duty, 91,250.

The number of regiments of infantry was, according to Dr. Bates's table, 242, which, by a remarkable coincidence, gives an average of 361 men present per regiment, within one man the same average as in Early's division. The Federal regiments were certainly not stronger than the Confederate ones. The reason is, that by the operation of the draft, however limited, the old regiments in the Southern army were at certain times refilled by recruits, while on the Union side, whenever a new call of volunteers was made it was by the creation of new regiments. It is a well known fact that as soon as a regiment left for the army it ceased altogether to recruit itself. The old regiments became, therefore, mere skeletons, and before the time of Grant very few of these were consolidated. The figures given by Meade and Butterfield, do not show, as has been alleged by Dr. Bates, all the men borne upon the rolls, nor, I think, as Confederate writers have asserted, only the men present for duty on the battlefield, but all the men who at the morning call were not reported absent, whatever may be their occupation at that time. The men known as having fallen off the ranks not being generally reported absent at once to give them a chance to join without losing their pay, the usual stragglers were in fact embraced in that figure.

Reduction by Straggling.—There were stragglers on both sides, but the Confederates, better accustomed to long marches, having left behind the sickly men and being in a country where the stragglers found no safety, had much less than the Federals; there could be none in Stuart's cavalry after the passage of the Potomac, as every man who dropped off had to be reported lost and considered as missing. The straggling was always very large in the Union army; it was especially so in a friendly country, where it was easy for the men to drop out from the ranks and remain for a time behind. I see no reason to doubt General Doubleday's statement that on the 1st of July, the First corps, when it reached Seminary Ridge, after several days of hard marching, was for the time being reduced from 11,350 men present to 8,200 fighting men. Many of the stragglers joined the army before the end of the battle, but it is not a high estimate to reckon at 10,000 the total loss entailed, by straggling, upon different corps of the Army of the Potomac at the arrival of each on the battle-field. Let us reckon only 6,000 stragglers on the Union and 2,500 on the Southern side, and deducting both cavalries which operated outside of the real field of battle, I think we can say that Meade brought about 75,000 blue-bellies against Lee's 54,000 grey-backs, and 300 guns against 268. If we were to take no notice of the stragglers, the figures would be 81,000 against some-

what less than 57,000; which figures are certainly, on both sides, above the mark. Taking the most favorable view for the Federal army, it would then have been either somewhat less than three-tenths or somewhat more than a fourth stronger than the Southern one; a numerical superiority not so great as that alleged by some Confederate writers, but which, at the time, no one, I believe, suspected at Meade's headquarters. Since the Army of the Potomac came into existence there was always a disposition to overrate the enemy's numerical strength.

French's division cannot be counted in this return, as it never was within reach of the field of battle and was left at Frederick to act as a kind of outpost to cover the garrison of Washington.

Couch's militia was too raw at the time to have been subjected to such an ordeal as a drawn fight in the open field against Lee's veteran soldiers.

Losses on Both Sides.—We have now the official figures, which preclude any further discussion on that subject; I acknowledge my mistake pointed out by Colonel Allan, concerning the losses of the Confederate army, as he acknowledges his regarding the losses of the Third corps.

From the returns of Stuart, now in my hands, his loss on the 2d and on the 3d of July, was 264, and including Imboden's and Jenkin's, must be above 300, while, on the other hand, we must deduct from the 22,728, about 700 men lost between the 3d and the 18th of July; therefore the whole Confederate loss at Gettysburg must have been about 22,300 or 22,400.

The official figures are for the Federals: Killed, 2,834; wounded, 13,709; missing, 6,643. Total, 23,186.

For the Confederates: Killed, 2,665; wounded, 12,599; missing, 7,464. Total, 22,728.

The number of Confederate prisoners reported by Meade was 13,621, but as this figure includes 7,262 wounded prisoners treated in the Federal hospitals, it leaves a balance of 6,359 valid prisoners only, which agrees well with the Confederate statement, about a thousand of the men reported missing, especially in Pickett's division, being really wounded left on the ground. There is therefore no discrepancy between these figures.

LOUIS PHILIPPE D'ORLEANS,
Comte de Paris.

CHATEAU D'EU SEINE INFÉRIEURE, FRANCE,
December 4th, 1877.

EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS have placed us under many obligations for the valuable papers they have furnished us, and we beg that they will have patience if their articles do not appear promptly. We have on hand a number of papers, reports, &c., which we are anxious to publish at the earliest possible moment, but we are unable to crowd into our pages more than they will hold.

ON PAGE 137 (March No.) the types make General Taylor speak of "the fame of *Dubois*," when he wrote "*Louvois*," who was, at the time alluded to, the War Minister of Louis the Fourteenth.

OUR GENERAL AGENT in the West, General George D. Johnston, continues to be most successful in his canvass, and to meet a cordial reception wherever he goes in Tennessee. In Nashville, Clarksville, and Jackson he has secured more than 350 subscribers. He is just beginning the canvass of Memphis. We again commend him as a gallant soldier and an accomplished gentleman every way worthy of confidence and esteem, but he needs no introduction to his comrades of the Western army.

OUR TRIP TO CHARLESTON, S. C., and participation in the 22d of February celebration, was a most delightful one, and we made notes of some matters of special historic interest, but want of space compels us to postpone them. We were also fortunate in securing as our agent for South Carolina Colonel Zimmerman Davis, a gallant soldier and excellent gentleman, who is making a most successful canvass for the Society.

OUR FINANCIAL PROSPECTS, (our friends will be glad to learn) continue to grow brighter, and if our receipts keep up in proportion to those of the past two months, we will have by far the most encouraging report for our next annual meeting which we have ever had.

THE SKETCH OF THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, by Major E. S. Gregory, of the Petersburg *Index and Appeal*, which was published in a recent issue of the Philadelphia *Weekly Times*, is an exceedingly graphic, entertaining, and valuable paper. We hope that his success in producing so readable and valuable a sketch will induce Major Gregory to try his facile pen on other scenes through which as a gallant soldier he passed.

THE SKETCH OF HART'S South Carolina battery, as given in the eloquent addresses of Major F. B. Hart and Governor Wade Hampton, would have appeared in this number, but that we are waiting for a corrected copy of Governor Hampton's speech.